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I.

INTRODUCTION

For those responsible for understanding tort doctrine, the
concept of foreseeability is a scourge, and its role in negligence cases is
a vexing, crisscrossed morass. Indeed, one torts professor teaches that
foreseeability might as well be called "strawberry shortcake," having
been bent, muddled, and co-opted to such a degree that it has lost any
real meaning.1
Foreseeability's role in the element of "duty" in negligence is
especially problematic. Courts have long tied the existence of a dutythat is, whether an allegedly negligent defendant owed an obligation
of care under the circumstances-to foreseeability. The more
foreseeable the risk, the resulting injury, the manner of injury, or the
person injured, so the reasoning goes, the greater the reason to impose
a duty on the defendant to have acted with care to avoid such risk or
injury. This is perhaps a reasonable approach at first blush. But
because duty is the sole element of negligence not left in the first
instance to the jury, duty-and hence, foreseeability-has become the
primary source of judicial power to weed out cases deemed by a judge
to be unworthy.
Regardless of one's general view regarding the proper breadth
of judges' gatekeeping power in negligence cases, foreseeability's
prominence in determinations of duty is problematic for two reasons.
First, judges' use of foreseeability as a means of deciding duty has a
pernicious effect on the rule of law. At the very least, foreseeability's
indeterminacy leads judges to treat like cases differently and different
cases alike. 2 If foreseeability truly is "strawberry shortcake," then it
may be little more than a surrogate for unbounded judicial discretion.
1.
Patricia K. Fitzsimmons & Bridget Genteman Hoy, Visualizing Foreseeability,45 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 907, 908, 911 (2001) (citing a torts professor's explanation that "a foreseeable act
may just as well be called 'strawberry shortcake' " because the term is merely a place-holder
representing "a malleable standard used by judges in their roles as gatekeepers and tweakers").
2.
See, e.g., Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence
Law: Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2001) (describing
foreseeability as "so open-ended that [it] can be used to explain any decision, even decisions
directly opposed to each other ....
[so as to] undermine clarity and certainty in the law
whenever [it is] embedded in a legal standard").
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Furthermore, to the extent that reference to foreseeability masks the
actual reasons for a judge's decision to impose or deny negligence
liability, foreseeability obfuscates the judicial process and likely
3
undermines its perceived legitimacy.
The second problem with foreseeability's role in duty is that it
operates as a vehicle by which judges decide questions traditionally
reserved for the jury. Specifically, by resolving duty based on an
analysis of whether the risk created by a defendant's conduct was
foreseeable, judges are really deciding whether the defendant's
conduct was reasonable-the essence of a jury's determination of
breach. By conditioning duty on whether one could foresee injury to
the particular plaintiff ("plaintiff-foreseeability") or whether the type
or manner of the injury was foreseeable, judges strip from juries their
task of deciding proximate cause. By folding considerations of breach
and proximate cause into the ambit of duty, judges also skirt
responsibility to decide such matters, if at all, according to the
deferential "no reasonable jury" standard-the standard pursuant to
which a court must decide as a matter of law what is typically a jury
question.
In May, 2002 the American Law Institute ("ALI") preliminarily
approved an installment of the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts
entitled, "Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles)." 4 Unlike the
previous two Restatements of Torts, Section 7(a) of the proposed
Restatement Third provides an affirmative standard for determining
the existence of a duty in the usual negligence case, a standard that is
at once prosaic and subtly revolutionary.
It reads: "An actor
ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when that actor's
conduct creates a risk of physical harm." 5 This restatement of duty is,
on its face, uncontroversial. For many years courts have recognized
the general principle that one owes a duty to avoid unreasonably
causing harm to others. What is transformative about Section 7(a),
however, is that it is clearly intended to operate not merely as a
general principle, but as a rule of law from which courts may only
depart, as Section 7(b) explains, due to "extraordinary... special
6
problems of principle or policy."
3.
See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., A Primer on the Patterns of Negligence, 53 LA. L. REV.
1509, 1523 (1993) (suggesting that "judges should not rely on, or hide behind, words like...
foreseeable, unforeseeable. ... and whatever other magic mumbo jumbo courts could use to
obfuscate the policies that were really at the heart of their decisions").
4.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2].
5.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 7(a)

(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 4].
6.
Id. § 7(b).
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Should courts take Section 7 of the proposed Restatement
seriously, they will find that duty has been purged of many of the
problems caused by its current reliance on foreseeability-a
consequence not fully acknowledged by the Restatement, its
Comments, or its Reporters' Notes. Specifically, by imposing a duty of
reasonable care in any case in which the defendant's conduct "created
a risk," Section 7 will 1) force judges to consider foreseeability of risk
under the rubric of breach, pursuant to the "no reasonable jury"
standard of review, rather than under the deference-free shroud of
duty; 7 2) shift consideration of plaintiff-foreseeability or of the type or
manner of the plaintiffs injury from duty to proximate cause;8 3) bring
into the realm of the general reasonableness duty certain cases that
commonly have been decided-at least in part by reference to
foreseeability-in the context of affirmative duties to warn, protect, or
rescue; 9 and 4) encourage judges who wish to make legislative-like
policy exceptions to negligence liability to do so expressly, rather than
by relying on the language of foreseeability. 10
Should courts adopt the proposed Restatement Third, it will
radically change many courts' understanding of duty and
foreseeability in negligence cases. The most important practical byproduct of this doctrinal change is the potential for a dramatic shift in
the balance of power between judge and jury. If judges no longer have
the power to dismiss cases under the auspices of duty for lack of
foreseeability, then more cases may reach the jury. One might argue
that it is not the place of a Restatement to effect such drastic reform
in negligence law and in courts' ability to administer that law.
Indeed, the general discussion in recent ALI meetings suggests that
many ALI members may not be aware of the transformative power of
Section 7. The proper reach of a Restatement is a valid concern,
although perhaps primarily a concern for the ALI and its desire to
maintain its influential role in American jurisprudence. As the final
Part of this Article explains, however, the proposed Restatement will,
if adopted by courts, likely affect the substantive outcome of
negligence cases only at the margins. The gatekeeping work currently
done by judges in the context of duty by reference to foreseeability will
still be done by judges, but under a new, less diffuse light. Judges will
still grant summary judgment when it is due, only pursuant to the
conclusion that no reasonable jury could find negligence or proximate

7.
8.
9.
10.

See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part

III.B.
III.C.
III.D.
III.E.
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cause under the circumstances or, in the unusual case, by transparent
reference to public policy. Thus, as the final Part argues, the balance
of power between judge and jury will not shift significantly, although
equilibrium will occur based on slightly different and clearer rules.
Part II of this Article attempts to piece together foreseeability's
present schizophrenic existence in the law of negligence and to explain
its current role in courts' determinations of duty, breach, and
proximate cause. Part III describes how the proposed Restatement
Third will alter courts' understanding and application of foreseeability
as a doctrinal matter. Finally, Part IV explores the practical effects of
the proposed Restatement on the balance of power between judge and
jury and on the outcomes of tort cases.

II.

THE CURRENT ROLE OF FORESEEABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE

In a vast majority of states, the prima facie case for negligence
consists of five elements: duty, breach, factual causation, proximate
causation, and injury." Courts use some notion of foreseeability in
12
deciding three of these elements: duty, breach, and proximate cause.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "foreseeability" as "[t]he
quality of being reasonably anticipatable."'13 According to Random
House, the verb "to foresee" means "to have prescience of; to know in
advance."'14
These definitions certainly track one's common
understanding of the term. As used in negligence law, however,
foreseeability has particular meaning that depends on its legal
context. In many courts the foreseeability lens seems to expand,
contract or change focus at the will of the judge. Indeed, as mentioned
above, some have argued that the doctrine of foreseeability has lost
any fixed meaning and instead acts as a mere surrogate for judicial
discretion.' 5 While this Article presupposes the existence of an
11. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 269 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 163-64 (5th ed. 1984). At least two courts

have seemingly enunciated a test for negligence that does not include an affirmative dutyrequirement. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Sharp, 952 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Ark. 1997) (stating that
negligence requires a showing of breach, causation, proximate causation, and injury); Fazzolari
v. Portland Sch. Dist., 734 P.2d 1326, 1336-37 (Or. 1987) (en banc) (holding that negligence is
shown where it is determined that the defendant "unreasonably created a foreseeable risk to a
protected interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff').
12. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE & JURY 66 (1930) (explaining that "a case is seemingly to be
subjected thrice to the ponderous process of the 'foreseeability' formula").
13. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999).
14.

WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 750 (2d ed. 2001).

15.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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intelligible set of meanings commonly accorded foreseeability in
negligence opinions, the term is surely among the most confounding in
the common law. 16
Before examining how the proposed Restatement Third will
affect the role of foreseeability in negligence suits, it is necessary to
gain some perspective as to how the concept is currently used. For
reasons that will become clear below, it is best to examine
foreseeability's role in the elements of negligence out of order.
Subsections A and B discuss courts' use of foreseeability when
deciding breach and proximate cause as a matter of law. Subsection C
then compares such use with foreseeability's part in duty and suggests
that the various inquiries into foreseeability are largely redundant.
A. Foreseeabilityin the Context of Breach
Perhaps foreseeability's most uncontroversial function in
negligence law lies in aiding the factfinder to determine breach. The
breach inquiry is the core of the negligence cause of action because it
calls for a decision regarding the defendant's blameworthiness, or
culpability. Where the judge has determined that the defendant owed
a duty and has delineated the broad contours of that duty in a
statement of the "standard of care," the jury must then decide, 17 in the
context of breach, whether the defendant's conduct failed to conform to
that standard.1 8 It is worth emphasizing that breach exists as an
element independent of the element of duty. Where a defendant owed
a duty of care under the circumstances but did not breach that duty,
the defendant will not be found negligent. Similarly, a defendant
whose actions were unreasonable, but who owed no duty to act
reasonably, also will escape liability. 19 Courts must therefore engage
in separate analyses, and reach independent conclusions, as to duty
and as to breach.
The near-universal standard of care in negligence cases is the
20
duty to act as would a reasonable person under the circumstances.
Foreseeability makes its entrance in the application of this reasonable
16. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Many Faces of Foreseeability, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
156, 156 (2000) ("Foreseeability is undoubtedly a muddle in the law of negligence.").
17. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 115, at 270.
18.

PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 30, at 164.

19.

Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND].

20. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 19, § 283. The proposed Restatement Third echoes
this formulation: "A person acts with negligence if the person does not exercise reasonable care
under all the circumstances." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC

PRINCIPLES) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1].
adopted Tentative Draft No. 1 preliminarily in May 2001.

The ALI
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person standard. Where judges rule on breach as a matter of law,
"reasonableness" often turns on 1) the degree of foreseeable likelihood,
from the point of view of a reasonable person in defendant's position,
that defendant's actions might result in injury; 21 2) the range in
severity of foreseeable injuries; and (3) the benefits and burdens of
available precautions or alternative manners of conduct.22 Together,
the likelihood and severity of foreseeable injury constitute the "risk"
created by an actor's conduct. 23 According to many courts, the higher
the risk-that is, the more probable it was that foreseeable injury
might result from particular behavior and the more severe the range
of foreseeable injuries-the more careful the defendant is required to
24
have been.
For example, suppose that a driver who pulled his car onto a
road's shoulder in order to watch the setting sun is struck by a passing
21.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 76-77, 86-87 (M.D. Howe ed., 1963)

(1881) [hereinafter THE COMMON LAW].

22. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1947)
(enshrining these factors in the mathematical formula in which liability lies where B (burden of
precautions) < P (probability of loss) x L (magnitude of loss)); Markowitz v. Ariz. Parks Bd., 706
P.2d 364, 369 (Ariz. 1985) (recognizing that foreseeability of risk and the burden of precautions
are "factors which determine the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct"); PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 11, § 65, at 453-54 ("The unreasonableness of the risk which [reasonable
person of ordinary prudence] incurs is judged by the ... process of weighing the importance of
the interest he is seeking to advance, and the burden of taking precautions, against the
probability and probable gravity of the anticipated harm .... ); DOBBS, supra note 11, §§ 143146 (explaining in detail the interplay of foreseeability and reasonableness here summarized).
23. See e.g., Zettle v. Handy Mfg. Co., 998 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[A] showing of the
magnitude of foreseeable risks ... includ[es] the likelihood of occurrence of the type of
accident ... and the severity of injuries sustainable from such an accident."); Diocese of Winona
v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 858 F. Supp 1407, 1418 (D. Minn. 1994) ("Determining whether
taking the risk was reasonable involves, in turn, weighing the foreseeable likelihood that the
harm would occur against its foreseeable severity."); McKinney v. Louisiana Nat. Bank, 416
So.2d 948, 951 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("Negligence is conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of
foreseeable harm to others ... [which] is unreasonable ... if the magnitude of the risk created
out-weighs the utility or social value of the conduct creating it; in this respect consideration is
given, inter alia, to the probability or extent of the harm to others threatened by the risk.").
24. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 20, § 3, Reporters' Note to cmt. d. The Reporters'
Note cites a long list of cases for the proposition that the amount of care required is
proportionate to the extent of danger involved. See, e.g., Lollar v. Poe, 622 So.2d 902, 905 (Ala.
1993) ("The degree of care required of an animal owner should be commensurate with the
propensities of the particular animal and with the place where the animals are kept, including
its proximity to high-speed highways."); Indus. Chem. & Fiberglass Corp. v. Chandler, 547 So.2d
812, 831 (Ala. 1988) ("[Tlhose who deal with dangerous instrumentalities, such as explosives or
chemicals, must exercise a great amount of care because the risk is great."); Blanchard v. City of
Bridgeport, 463 A.2d 553, 555 (Conn. 1993) ("The degree of care to be exercised by keepers of
wild animals to protect visitors from harm must, at the very least, be equal to the coiled spring
danger that lurks within the cage."). See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 31, at 170-71
(explaining that although "[n]early all human acts, or course, carry some recognizable but remote
possibility of harm to another," precaution is required "if the risk is an appreciable one, and the
possible consequences are serious").
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car. The success of the plaintiff sun-gazer's suit (or in a comparative
negligence jurisdiction, the amount of his recovery) may turn on
whether he acted unreasonably in pulling his car onto the shoulder. If
the collision occurred on a straight, infrequently traveled country
road, such a collision might be deemed relatively improbable and
unforeseeable, and therefore the plaintiffs conduct reasonable. If the
road was the Long Island Expressway, however, and if the plaintiff
had pulled onto the shoulder during rush-hour, both the foreseeable
likelihood of a collision and the severity of foreseeable injury (the risk
of a multiple-vehicle accident) rise dramatically.
Because the
combination of the foreseeable likelihood of injury and the severity of
foreseeable injury is higher on the Long Island Expressway than on a
country road, the plaintiffs conduct would be more unreasonable in
the context of the former than the latter.
The brand of foreseeability associated with breach is one of
general focus. That is, it does not examine the foreseeability of the
particular injury suffered by the plaintiff, but the foreseeable
likelihood and severity of injuries that might have occurred. 25 This
focus is tied to foreseeability's role in. deciding a defendant's
blameworthiness. In negligence law, blameworthiness is judged by a
defendant's conduct alone and is not dependent upon the actual
results of that conduct. 26 For example, suppose that two drinking
companions consume an equal amount of alcohol, then pass out while
driving home in their respective cars. One car drifts off the road into a
private lawn, knocking down the owner's mailbox en route. The other
car veers into a parked car, killing the two teenagers within.
Although the two drivers will be liable for different amounts of
damages (assuming the mailbox was not the work of Midas), the
drivers are equally negligent, equally blameworthy. In other words,
they each27breached their duty of care in the same way and to the same
"extent." The breach analysis is the same for each driver because
25. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 143, at 335, explaining, in the context of a discussion of
breach:
So if a speeding driver crashes into your living room, the fact that a reasonable person
would not have specifically recognized a risk of harm to living room furniture will not
assist the driver to avoid liability. It is one of the cluster of harms in a generally
foreseeable category, and that is enough.
26. Under criminal law, one driver will be guilty of manslaughter, while the other will only
be guilty of property damage. Thus, the defendants' culpability is tied not only to their acts, but
also to the consequences of their acts.
27. In fact, it is not particularly accurate to use the word "extent" to speak of negligence
liability. Where there is only one alleged tortfeasor, that tortfeasor is either negligent or is not.
Although each driver must pay a different amount of damages according to the injury that the
driver caused, injury is a separate element of the negligence cause of action. The element of
breach is blind to the injuries actually caused. One might contrast this system with that of
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each produced the same range of foreseeable risks under identical
circumstances. Thus, it might be said that in the context of breach,
foreseeability's concern is risk generally, not whether the particular
result is one for which defendant should be held liable. This latter
concern is addressed by proximate cause.
B. Foreseeability in the Context of Proximate Cause
Once it has been determined that a defendant owed and
breached a duty and that the breach in fact caused the plaintiffs
injury, the law imposes yet another prerequisite to liability. Dubbed
"proximate cause," 28 "legal cause," 29 or as in the proposed Restatement
Third, "scope of liability," 30 this element of negligence serves to limit
the consequences of an actor's conduct. 31 Through proximate cause,
courts recognize that ,although "the consequences of an act go forward
to eternity ..... any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a
basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would
'set society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation."'3 2
Proximate cause thus focuses on the nature and extent of the
connection between a defendant's unreasonable conduct and the
plaintiffs injury 33 and cuts off liability at the point where "the harm
that resulted from the defendant's negligence is so clearly outside the
risks created that it would be unjust or at least impractical to impose
34
liability."

criminal law, in which the relative guilt of the two drivers is conditioned not only upon the
defendants' conduct, but also upon the results of that conduct. Here, for example, although both
drivers are guilty of driving under the influence, one driver is also guilty of the separate crime of
manslaughter, the other of destruction of property.
28. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 263.
29. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 19, § 281(c); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 41,
at 263.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) § 29,
Special Note on Proximate Cause, at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003) [hereinafter TENTATIVE
DRAFT NO. 3].
31. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 11, § 41 at 264. According to Patrick Kelley and
Joseph Bingham, the doctrine of proximate cause arose "in response to [an] under-elaborated
notion of duty," Kelley, supra note 2, at 1061, as a means of limiting a defendant's liability to
"the purposes for which the unperformed duty was imposed." Joseph W. Bingham, Some
Suggestions Concerning"Legal Cause"at Common Law, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 23-37 (1909).
32. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 41, at 264.
33. Id. See also 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 13.4, at 137-47 (2d ed.
1986); Galligan, supra note 3, at 1513 (explaining that proximate cause is "really a way of
deciding whether society ought to hold this defendant, whose negligent acts were a cause-in-fact
of the plaintiffs damages, liable under these circumstances, to this plaintiff ... [or to] sever the
chain of causation").
34. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 180, at 443.
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Defining this point, however, has been no small trick. In some
jurisdictions, for example, defendants are not liable for injuries or to
plaintiffs that are too "remote" in time or space 35 or outside of the
"unbroken natural sequence" of events that caused the harm. 36 In
others, the line is drawn where the causal path is too "indirect"37 or
where certain "intervening causes" foreclose liability. 38 Still others
endorse an even less helpful formulation by which proximate cause is
satisfied where a defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in
causing the plaintiffs injury. 39 The proposed Restatement Third
adopts a rather elegant (though perhaps no more directive) standard
according to which "an actor is not liable for harm different from the
40
harms whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious."
Explanations and tests for proximate cause abound. A common
thread among proximate cause cases, however, is that either
some notion of
explicitly 41 or implicitly, 42 most consider

35. See, e.g., Casey v. Corson & Gruman Co., 221 F.2d 51, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (A negligently
operated truck, stolen by one without defendant's authority hours before collision in question,
"was too remote from the collision in time, place, and circumstances to be a proximate cause of
plaintiffs injuries..."); Peterson v. Underwood, 264 A.2d 851, 855 (Md. 1970) ("[A]lthough an
injury might not have occurred 'but for' an antecedent act of the defendant, liability may not be
imposed ... if the injury is so remote in time and space from defendant's original negligence that
another's negligence intervenes."); Wallace v. Jones, 190 S.E. 82, 84-86 (Va. 1937) (holding
proximate cause absent, and therefore refusing to find defendant liable for injuries plaintiff
sustained in collision with third party while waiting at scene of accident caused by defendant).
36. 4 HARPER ETAL., supra note 33, § 20.5, at 174.
37. See, e.g., In re Polemis, 3 K.B. 560, 571 (Eng. C.A. 1921) (finding proximate cause,
because the injury was "directly caused" by a ship worker who carelessly dropped a wooden
board into the ship's hold, sparking petrol vapors, the resulting fire from which destroyed the
ship).
38. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 181 N.E.2d 430, 434-35 (1962)
(holding that intervening gross negligence supersedes the negligence of the plaintiff, thus failing
proximate cause).
39. See, e.g., Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 742 P.2d 377, 386 (Haw. 1987) (stating
that "substantial factor" is a phrase sufficiently intelligible to furnish an adequate guide in
instruction to the jury). One might interpret the substantial factor test as an attempt to
determine whether the defendant's actions were a sufficiently "substantial" cause of the
plaintiff's injury (that is, in comparison with the many other factual causes) that the defendant
should therefore be held liable. Such a test offers imprecise guidance on its face. It is even more
confusing in light of the fact that a different "substantial factor" test is also a means for finding
factual causation where "two independent forces concur to produce a result which either of them
alone would have produced." Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 429 (2d Cir. 1969).
Courts frequently confuse the two.
40. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 30, § 29.
41. See, e.g., Tetro v. Town of Stratford, 458 A.2d 5, 7-8 (Conn. 1983) ("The test for finding
proximate cause 'is whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the
foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence.' ").
42. For example, the Restatement Third approach might be described as little more than a
"foreseeability of type of harm" standard. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 3, supra note 30, § 29, cmt. j.
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foreseeability. 43 As explained above, foreseeability operates in the
context of breach as a form of risk contextualization-a foreseeability
of general focus (that some range of injuries, of some range of severity
might occur) which helps to define the blameworthiness of a
defendant's conduct.
Under the rubric of proximate cause, by
contrast, the foreseeability inquiry is not general but specific to the
particular injury suffered by the particular plaintiff at hand. Even
where injury of some kind to some person was foreseeable and
therefore supports a finding of breach, a plaintiff may fail to survive
the proximate cause inquiry where the defendant's actions resulted in
1) an unforeseeable type of injury,44 2) an injury occurring in an
46
unforeseeable manner, 45 or 3) injury to an unforeseeable plaintiff.
Furthermore, foreseeability in the context of proximate cause does not
help to decide whether the defendant acted unreasonably, as in the
context of breach, but rather aids in the decision of whether the actual
consequences of defendant's conduct were so bizarre or far-removed
from the risks that made the actor's conduct negligent that the
defendant, though blameworthy, should not be held liable for them.
The famous 1961 case known as The Wagon Mound 47 is
illustrative. The good ship Wagon Mound was anchored in Sydney
Harbor when, due to some bungling by the ship's crew, it began to
discharge furnace oil into the harbor waters. Although furnace oil
created no foreseeable risk of fire when spread across water, it did
pose a foreseeable risk of congealing on and interfering with the use of
the harbor docks. Pointing to this risk, the court concluded that the
crew's conduct was unreasonable, and that the defendant had

43.

DOBBS, supra note 11, § 181, at 444; MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW

AND ALTERNATIVES 399 (7th ed. 2001).
44. See, e.g., Baltimore City Passenger Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 82-83 (1884) (finding
unforeseeable that a speeding driver would hit another car, that the collision would bruise the
shin of its driver, and that the bruise would later become cancerous). But see, e.g., Hines v.
Morrow, 236 S.W, 183, 187-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (finding foreseeable, as a matter of law, that
a pothole left by defendant in a highway would stall a car, that a good-Samaritan attempting to
pull it out would get his wooden leg stuck in the mud, and that a loop in the tow rope would lasso
his good leg and break it).
45. See, e.g., Bunting v. Hogsett, 21 A. 31, 32-33 (Pa. 1891) (finding foreseeable, as a matter
of law, the injury of a railroad passenger where a collision threw a railroad engine out of control,
the engine then ran around a circular track, and the engine struck the passenger in a second
collision).
46. See, e.g., In re Guardian Cas. Co., 2 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (finding
foreseeable, as a matter of law, where a collision that forced a taxi into a building, which in turn
loosened a stone, which fell and killed plaintiff, a bystander, while the taxi was being removed
twenty minutes after the initial accident).
47. Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (The Wagon Mound), [1961]
App. Cas. 388 (P.C. 1961).
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therefore breached its duty of care. 48 The harm the risk of which led
to a finding of breach, however, was not the harm that in fact
occurred. What actually happened is that a piece of cotton, which had
come to rest on some debris floating just beneath the oil slick, caught
fire from the spark of a welder's torch, ignited the oil floating on the
harbor waters, and burned the dock owned by the plaintiff.49 The
court reasoned that although the defendant's conduct created a risk
sufficiently foreseeable to sustain a finding of breach, the plaintiffs
actual injury was not foreseeable and was therefore a consequence for
which defendant should not be held liable despite the defendant's
50
blameworthy conduct.
Proximate cause, like breach, is decided in the first instance by
the jury. 5 1 That said, many courts-perhaps seeing far-reaching
normative implications embedded in proximate cause-do not afford
juries the same latitude typically given in the context of breach.
Rather, appellate courts frequently treat the proximate cause issue as
if it were a question of law, to be more readily reversed. 52 This
approach might be traced to the scholarly work of Leon Green, which,
in conjunction with the landmark decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad,53 blurred the distinction
between proximate cause, which is reserved for the jury, and duty,
which is the province of the judge. 54 Despite overlap in the choices
underlying duty and proximate cause, however, they stand as
separate elements and serve different conceptual purposes. With this
in mind, and after the foregoing explanation of foreseeability's role in
breach and in proximate cause, foreseeability's redundant role in duty
will stand in sharp relief.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 403.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 45, at 321.

52.

LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 76 (1927); Galligan, supra note 3, at

1513-14; Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present
Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 89 (1991).
53. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
54. See James E. Viator, When Cause-in-Fact Is More than a Fact: The Malone-Green
Debate on the Role of Policy in Determining FactualCausation in Tort Law, 44 LA. L. REV. 1519,
1523 (1984) (explaining Green's assertion that duty and proximate cause ask essentially the
same question: whether the plaintiffs interest warrants protection).

2005]

PURGING FORESEEABILITY
C. Foreseeabilityin the Context of Duty
1. The General Concept of Duty

A defendant is only blameworthy for unreasonable behavior if
that defendant owed a duty of reasonable care in the first place.
Similarly, the question of whether a defendant who has acted
unreasonably should be held liable for the consequences is only
relevant if the defendant owed some kind of duty. Duty is thus a
separate, fundamental element of the negligence cause of action,
supported by its own unique analysis-unfortunately, an analysis that
is commonly confused with that of breach or proximate cause.
The imposition of a duty is the province of the court. 55 It is a
two-step process. First, the judge must decide whether the defendant
owed a duty at all. Second, the judge must define the scope of that
duty in the form of a standard of care. 56 Most courts have followed
these steps to arrive at a general structure for duty in negligence
cases involving physical injury. The foundation of this structure is the
long-recognized principle that one generally owes a duty to avoid
affirmatively causing physical harm to others.5 7 The flip side of this
universal duty is that one generally does not owe a duty to warn,
protect, or rescue a person from risks created by another source. 58
There are, however, a number of commonly-held exceptions to this "no
duty to rescue" rule. These so-called "affirmative duties" include, for
example, the duty to rescue persons with whom one has a judiciallyrecognized special relationship 59 and the duty to continue (under
55. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 19, § 328B; DOBBS, supra note 11, § 149, at 355.
56. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supranote 19, § 328B; DOBBS, supra note 11, § 149, at 355.
57. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal. 1975) (stating that "every case
is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are required to use ordinary care
to prevent others from being injured as the result of their conduct"); Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D.
503, 509 (1883):
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to
another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that is
he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those
circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other,
a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.
See also, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 11, § 227, at 578; 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 33, § 18; KEETON
ET AL., supra note 11, § 53 at 356-59; TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 4, supra note 5, § 37, cmt. b
(Reporter's Note) (citing string of cases that recognize the general duty not to create a risk of
harm).
58. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 19, § 314; DOBBS, supra note 11, § 314, at 853.
59. See, e.g., Methola v. County of Eddy, 629 P.2d 350, 353-54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that jailors owe duty to protect and rescue inmates from other abusive inmates); RESTATEMENT
SECOND, supra note 19, § 314A (explaining that common carriers, innkeepers, land possessors,
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certain
limited
circumstances)
a rescue
effort
voluntarily
60
undertaken.
What judges decide in the context of duty, and how they decide
it, has been the subject of centuries-long debate. Nevertheless, a
general description is possible. Duty means "an obligation, to which
the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to some standard of
conduct toward another."6' In this sense, the concept of duty in tort
tracks the term's common meaning as "something that one is expected
or required to do by moral or legal obligation. '6 2 Of course, such a
definition raises the question as to the method by which judges impose
and define legal obligations. Judges enjoy wide discretion in doing
so, 63 although their analysis appears to focus on five major
considerations:
(1) Community notions of obligation. Since as early as
sixteenth-century England, the common law has drawn duties "from
pre-judicial community-defined obligations, based on the accepted
coordination norms of the community." 64 Whether and, if so, how
courts arrive at a consistent understanding of community notions is a
matter of spirited jurisprudential debate. 65 Most agree, however, that
and those in custodial roles owe to customers, invitees, or those in their custody a duty to protect,
warn of dangers, and offer first aid).
60. Generally, a voluntary rescuer must use reasonable care to continue a rescue effort if
failure to do so would leave the rescuee in a worse position than he or she was found by the
rescuer. E.g. Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 21 P.3d 667, 672 (Utah Ct. App.
2001).
61. William L. Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1953).
62. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 608 (1996).
63. See Kelley, supra note 2, at 1041 (observing that " 'duty,' ... seems like a description of
a conclusion the court reaches by a decisional process unguided by the prima facie formulation
itself"); Prosser, supra note 61, at 15 ("There is a duty if the court says there is a duty; the law,
like the Constitution, is what we make it.").
64. Kelley, supra note 2, at 1059-60 (citing S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1981); M.J. PRICHARD, SCOTT V. SHEPHERD (1773) AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE (1976)).
65. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 227 (1986) (positing that, with cases of first
impression for which there is no precedent, a judge must, to reach the proper resolution,
ascertain the scheme of principles behind past decisions, insofar as the community still enforces
those legal standards, and apply it to the instant case; judges are not to legislate from the bench
based on their own conception of community morality); id. at 97:
[A community's] law belongs to the community not just passively, because its
members hold certain views about what is right or wrong, but as a matter of active
commitment, because its officials have taken decisions that commit the community to
the rights and duties that make up law. But a particular conception of law may
nevertheless make the question of what rights and duties do follow from past political
decisions depend in some way on popular morality as well as on the explicit content of
these decisions. Or it may deny that there is any such connection. The concept of law,
understood as I have suggested, is itself neutral between ... these competing
explanations of the connection between a community's reigning opinions and its legal
commitments.
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community consensus regarding day-to-day obligations is an
important consideration in the duty analysis. 66 As one court put it,
"the question of whether a duty should be imposed in a particular case
is essentially one of fairness under contemporary standards-whether
67
reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that it exists."
(2) A broad, legislative sense of social policy. Duty is frequently
described as a form of judicial legislation, based on broad social
concerns, regarding the ultimate issue of liability.6 8 Although this
69
characterization might be inaccurate as a comprehensive theory,
social policy concerns undoubtedly play an important role in many
duty decisions. A few examples suffice to illustrate: In deciding
whether to impose a duty, California courts expressly consider, among
other factors, "[the] policy of preventing future harm; ...
[the]
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach; and. . . [the] availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." 70 Where a power
company's grossly unreasonable behavior caused a widespread outage,
the New York Court of Appeals refused to impose a duty to noncustomers on the grounds that extensive liability would expose the
defendant to financial ruin and endanger the public's power supply."

See also Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) ("The law
is the witness and external deposit of our moral life."); id. at 466 ("We do not realize how large a
part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of the public mind.").
See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (offering a theory of the growth of norms and deriving some
implications for how law can govern norms; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (challenging some notions of rationality, choice, and freedom and
developing conclusions about human nature).
66. See, e.g., Davis v. Westwood Group, 652 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Mass. 1999) ("In determining
whether the defendant had a duty to be careful, we look to existing social values and customs, as
well as to appropriate social policy."); Prosser, supra note 61, at 15 ("In the end the court will
decide whether there is a duty on the basis of the mores of the community .. "); John C.P.
Goldberg, Note, Community and the Common Law Judge: Restructuring Cardozo's Theoretical
Writings, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1334-35 (1990) (discussing tort law's incorporation of social
norms and expectations).
67. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 229, at 582 (quoting Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 356
(Colo. 1992)).
68. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, § 53, at 358 (stating that duty is "only an
expression of policy which leads the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection");
Holmes, supra note 65, at 466-68 (discussing idea generally).
69. See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998) (mounting a sustained attack on Prosser's conception of duty as
mere policy).
70. Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
71. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985). Similarly, one common
theory of courts' early use of the concept of duty is that it provided a means of limiting the
liability of burgeoning industrial manufacturers. See Prosser, supra note 61, at 13 (noting that
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And where the imposition of a duty on a governmental defendant
would interfere with that entity's discretion in allocating scarce
resources, courts commonly demure. 72
Each of the above
considerations has little to do with a community's understanding of
one's day-to-day obligations to others, but rather are policy concerns of
73
a legislative nature.
(3) Concern for the rule of law. Because duty is the only prima
facie element in negligence decided by the court, it provides judges
their primary means of ensuring that like cases are decided alike and
different cases differently. Determinations of negligence are, however,
overwhelmingly fact-specific. Thus, duty rules most often cast a wide
net, create rough categories of obligations, and set general standards
74
rather than particularized codes of conduct.
(4) The goal of convenience of administration.75
A few
categories of tort cases present special evidentiary problems or
questions that are particularly resistant to principled analysis. In
such cases, courts have convened special duty rules in an attempt to
limit liability and provide stronger-than-usual guidance to juries. The

the concept of duty possibly emerged from the English common law courts as a means of limiting
"the responsibilities of growing industry within some reasonable means").
72. See, e.g., Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968) (refusing to impose
duty on municipality to provide police protection to a woman who had been threatened by a
former paramour on the grounds that such a duty "would inevitably determine how the limited
police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits").
73. Some have proposed that the policy considerations that inform duty are of a specific
type-those relating in some way to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant, or between
the class of people of which the plaintiff is a member and the class of people of which the
defendant is a member.
Decisions against liability based upon other types of policy
considerations-policies that do not involve such relationships-may therefore not be duty
decisions at all, but merely decisions to impose immunity. See Jonathan Cardi, Apportioning
Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument Based on Comparative Responsibility and
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1312-13, 1332 (1997)
(concluding, despite this theoretical difference between the policies underlying duty and
immunity, that the distinction is too fine to draw as a practical matter); Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 69, at fns. 82 & 111 (noting that Holmes, unlike Prosser, explained no-liability-forpublic-policy cases in terms of immunity rather than duty). Others conclude that the policies
that inform duty are no different than those underlying immunity. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 226,
at 575-76. Due to the broad language of Section 7(b) of the proposed Restatement, the author
does not here find it necessary to pick a side in this debate.
74. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 227, at 579 (describing duty decisions as "expressions of
'global' policy rather than evaluations of specific facts of the case" and explaining that "no-duty
rules should be invoked only when all cases they cover fall substantially within the policy that
frees the defendant of liability. ... [R]ules of law having the quality of generality.... should not
be merely masks for decisions in particular cases."); see also infra notes 293-305 and
accompanying text.
75. See Prosser, supra note 61, at 15 ("In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many
factors interplay: ... [including] the convenience of administration of the rule .... ").
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rules governing claims for emotional distress owe their origin to such
concerns. 76
(5) Foreseeability. Foreseeability of some kind plays a role in
many courts' analysis of duty. Often, foreseeability is cited as a
reason to impose a duty where one would not otherwise exist-for
example, due to the rescue rule. 77 Courts also sometimes cite lack of
foreseeability as grounds for denying a duty, even where the
defendant's conduct created a risk of physical harm. 78 Indeed, in some
cases, foreseeability seems so closely tied to the concept of duty that a
ruling on foreseeability proves determinative of the duty element. 79 In
others, foreseeability is but one factor, if an important one, in the duty
calculus.8 0 A discussion of the various uses of foreseeability in the
context of duty follows.
2. Duty and Foreseeability
a. Foreseeabilityof plaintiff
Considerable debate has taken place over the decades as to
whether duty is, at its root, relational-that is, whether an obligation

76. See Galligan, supra note 3, at 1511 (noting that in the context of claims for emotional
distress, "a court may decide there is no duty owed .... [for] administrative convenience").
Claims for emotional distress pose several unique administrative challenges: scientific and legal
shortcomings in the ability to determine accurately the existence and extent of emotional harm;
the problem of approximating emotional harm in dollar awards; and the threat of a "floodgate of
litigation" over claims of "trivial" emotional injury. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 302, at 823-24.
In response to these challenges, courts have imposed only limited duties on defendants to avoid
causing purely emotional harm. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 42936 (1997) (outlining common-law limited duties to avoid causing emotional distress and
explaining the policy reasons for such limitations).
77. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Keene, 623 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1993) (explaining that a
jailer may be liable for injuries sustained from an inmate's suicide attempt if the attempt was
foreseeable).
78. See, e.g., Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 73 P.3d 181, 187 (N.M. 2003) ("For our duty
analysis, 'it must be determined that the injured party was a foreseeable plaintiff-that he [or
she] was within the zone of danger created by [the defendant's] actions'....") (alteration in
original) (quoting Calkins v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 38 (N.M. 1990)).
79. See, e.g., Harper v. Remington Arms Co., 280 N.Y.S. 862, 868-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935)
(finding that a gun manufacturer had no duty and thus was not liable for injuries resulting from
use of highly-charged ammunition, meant only for use in firearms testing and distributed only to
testing parties, because injured party was an unforeseeable user who was given the shells by a
third party).
80. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (holding
that among several factors to be considered in analyzing duty, "[t]he most important of these
considerations ... is foreseeability"); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 69, at 1818-19 (citing
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), for the proposition that reasonable
foreseeability is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the imposition of a duty of care).
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of care is comprehensible only in relation to a class of people to whom
the obligation is owed.81 According to the non-relational view, courts
impose a duty of care solely on the basis of public policy and
community standards, without regard to the question of to whom such
a duty runs.8 2 Whether a particular plaintiff is within the scope of the
risk created by a defendant's breach is, from the non-relational
perspective, the stuff of proximate cause and a question of the outer
limits of liability.8 3 By contrast, a relational account of duty posits
that an obligation simply cannot exist in a vacuum. Like the verbs "to
meet" or "to injure,"8 4 the concept of "obligation" or "duty" is
incomplete without some connection to a person or class of persons.
The relational approach therefore considers whether the class of
people of which defendant is a member owes an obligation to the class
85
of people that includes the plaintiff.
The debate over the relational nature of duty was made famous
by the contrasting opinions of Justice Cardozo and Justice Andrews in
Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad.86 Palsgrafinvolved the claim of a
railroad passenger who, while standing on a station platform, was
injured by a falling set of scales. The scales had been toppled by the
force of an explosion at the other end of the platform that resulted
from an exploding package of fireworks knocked from the hands of a
passenger as railroad employees negligently helped the passenger

81. Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) ("The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation."), with
Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting) ("Due care is a duty imposed on each one of
us to protect society,... not to protect A, B, or C alone.").
82. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 53, at 357 ("Certainly [in the early common
law] there is little trace of any notion of a relation between the parties, or an obligation to any
one individual, as essential to the tort. The defendant's obligation to behave properly apparently
was owed to all the world .... ); Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652,
661 (1873) (describing the universal tort duty as "a duty imposed on all the world, in favor of
all"); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 38 (1972) (recognizing a
"general rule... that the defendant owes to those whom he might chance upon and injure a duty
to exercise due care" and accounting for no-duty or limited-duty exceptions as anachronisms or
limitations of liability based on economic efficiency).
83. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 69, at 1817-18.
84. The French forms of these verbs are instructive: "to meet" is "faire la connaissance de,"
and "to injure" is "faire mal A." The prepositions "de" and "A"at the end of these verbs indicate
that the verbs cannot be used without connecting them to the person "met" or "injured."
85. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 69, at 1820 (explaining that "[f]or Cardozo [in
PalsgraA], the foreseeability of harm to a class of persons goes to the question of whether certain
conduct is owed to those persons, not to whether certain liabilities are appropriately borne by
defendants"); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 59-60 (1998) (distinguishing between relational and non-relational theories of tort
duty).
86. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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onto the departing train.8 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo
overturned a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds that
the defendant railroad owed no duty to the plaintiff under the
circumstances. According to Cardozo, "The risk reasonably to be
88
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation.
Because it was not foreseeable that the railroad employees' actions
would cause injury to the plaintiff, who stood at the other end of the
platform, the employees' conduct, though unreasonable, breached no
duty owed to the plaintiff.8 9 According to Justice Andrews, however,
who wrote in dissent, "Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to
protect society, . . . not to protect A, B, or C alone." 90 Thus, when the
railroad employees unreasonably knocked the package out of the
hurrying passenger's hands, they breached the universal "duty of
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety
of others,"9 1 a duty limited only by the requirement of proximate
causation. Justice Andrews would therefore have upheld the jury's
verdict because he could not rule as a matter of law that the plaintiffs
92
injuries were not the proximate result of the defendant's breach.
Whether a court considers the defendant-plaintiff nexus in the
context of proximate cause-"was this plaintiff within the scope of the
risk created by the defendant's breach?"-as did Justice Andrews, or
as a matter of duty-"did the defendant owe a duty to this plaintiff?"as did Justice Cardozo, the underlying issue is the same: "[S]hould the
court hold the defendant liable to this plaintiff?" 93
Plaintiffforeseeability often plays an important part in courts' analyses of this
issue. 94 The more foreseeable the plaintiff, so the reasoning goes, the
greater the reason to hold the defendant liable. Although the inquiry
is identical, however, the context in which it is decided is importantplaintiff-foreseeability in the context of duty is decided by the judge; it
is the jury that decides plaintiff-foreseeability as a matter of
proximate cause. And courts cannot seem to agree on which is the
proper place. 95 Indeed, courts within the same jurisdiction, and even
87. Id. at 99.
88. Id. at 100.
89. Id. at 99-101.
90. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
93. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
94. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 69, at 1818-19 (noting as much in the context of a
discussion of the Palsgrafand MacPhersoncases).
95. Compare Lynden v. Walker, 30 P.3d 609, 615-16 (Alaska 2001) (analyzing plaintiffforeseeability in context of duty when plaintiff suffered injury unloading pipes from truck that
was negligently loaded by defendant warehouse operator); Fawley v. Martin's Supermarkets,

758

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:739

the very same court, often come down on different sides of this
question in different cases. 96
Moreover, plaintiff-foreseeability
frequently makes a dual appearance, influencing both duty and
97
proximate cause analyses.
Courts not only differ on whether plaintiff-foreseeability
properly informs duty or proximate cause, they also disagree as to the
scope of plaintiff-foreseeability to be considered. For some courts,
plaintiff-foreseeability is a matter of categorical scope, a means of
delineating broad duties owed by one class of persons to another.
Here, the test for plaintiff-foreseeability is whether the class of
persons of which plaintiff is a member was foreseeable to the class of

Inc., 618 N.E.2d 10, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (same when plaintiffs sued supermarket for
negligent failure to protect them from drunk driver outside defendant's business); Fiala v. Rains,
519 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Iowa 1994) (same when plaintiff sued defendant for injuries suffered from
beating administered by defendant's boyfriend in defendant's apartment); Valentine v. On
Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947, 949-50 (Md. 1999) (same when plaintiff sued defendant gun dealer for
murder of plaintiffs decedent, committed by third party with gun stolen from defendant's store);
Mellon Mortgage Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 655 (Tex. 1999) (same in suit for damages when
plaintiff was pulled over by police officer, ordered to drive several blocks to defendant's parking
garage, then sexually assaulted by officer in parking garage); Rikstad v. Holmberg, 456 P.2d 355,
358 (Wash. 1969) ("Foreseeability is ... more appropriately attached to the issues of whether
defendant owed plaintiff a duty, and, if so, whether the duty imposed by the risk embraces that
conduct which resulted in injury to plaintiff."), with Wintersteen v. Nat. Cooperage &
Woodenware Co., 197 N.E. 578, 582 (Ill. 1935) ("It is axiomatic that every person owes a duty to
all persons to exercise ordinary care to guard against any injury which may naturally flow as a
reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of his act.... [T]his duty ....
extends to
remote and unknown parties."); Alvarado v. Sersch, 662 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Wis. 2003) ("Wisconsin
has long followed the minority view of duty set forth in the dissent of Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad .... '[E]veryone owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that
may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.' ") (citation omitted) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)).
96. Compare Bryant v. Glastetter, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (analyzing
plaintiff-foreseeability in context of duty when decedent, a tow truck driver, was killed by a third
party while impounding defendant's vehicle after his arrest for drunk driving), with Schrimsher
v. Bryson, 130 Cal. Rptr. 125, 127-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (analyzing foreseeability in context of
proximate cause in suit for damages when plaintiff, a police officer, was hit by a drunk third
party while arresting defendant for drunk driving). See generally Bobby M. Harges, The Rebirth
of Proximate Cause in Louisiana:A Call for the Return to Duty Risk Analysis, 39 LOY. L. REV.
769 (1994) (discussing the modest resurgence in Andrews-like proximate cause analysis in
Louisiana negligence cases).
97. See, e.g., Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1989) (discussed infra notes
103-105 and accompanying text); Griesenbeck v. Walker, 488 A.2d 1038, 1041-45 (N.J. Super Ct.
App. Div. 1985) (analyzing duty to plaintiff and proximate cause in terms of foreseeability when
defendant-social hosts served alcohol to visibly intoxicated daughter, who then drove home and
caused a fire in her home, killing herself, her husband, and her son, and injuring her plaintiffdaughter); Matthews v. Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co., 77 S.E.2d 180, 188-90 (W.Va. 1953)
(same in context of injured plaintiff-bystander who, when watching workers fix gas line, was
startled by line breaking and ran blindly into highway, where he was hit by an oncoming car).

2005]

PURGING FORESEEABILITY

759

persons of which defendant is a member. 98 In negligence claims for
physical injury, this form of plaintiff-foreseeability often, although not
always, appears in courts' consideration of affirmative duties. For
example, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,99 the
California Supreme Court imposed on the defendant psychologist a
duty to warn the plaintiffs decedent Tatiana Tarasoff, a nonpatient, of
a risk of physical harm posed by one of the psychologist's patients. 100
The court's duty analysis did not turn on the particular facts of the
Tarasoff case. Rather, the court imposed a duty, at least in part, due
to the special ability of psychologists as a class to foresee danger posed
by patients to third parties. 10 1 Thus, the court did not simply impose a
duty on the particular defendant in Tarasoff to the particular plaintiff.
It created a broad category of duty, to be imposed on all psychologists
(or perhaps, mental health workers) to all foreseeable nonpatients at
10 2
risk of imminent attack by a patient.
Other courts feel free to examine plaintiff-foreseeability in a
less categorical, more fact-specific light. For example, in Mussivand v.
David,10 3 the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether an adulterer
owed a duty to the spouse of his adulteress not to transmit to him a
sexually transmitted disease.
Although foreseeability figured
prominently in the Mussivand court's duty analysis, the court did not

98. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 69, at 1818-20, 1828 (explaining that duty is a
relational concept, an inquiry that must focus on whether the defendant class owes a duty to the
plaintiff class to act in accordance with a certain standard of care).
99. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
100. Id. at 340.
101. Although the court stated that it was not necessary to "decide whether foreseeability
alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of
another's conduct," id. at 343, the court's analysis of the special relationship between
psychologist and patient turned in part on the fact that psychologists are uniquely privy to
knowledge of dangers posed by their clients. Zipursky, supra note 16, at 157-58.
102. Although the primary focus of this Article is the role of foreseeability in negligence cases
for physical injury, it should be noted that foreseeability of classes of plaintiffs also figures
significantly in the determination of duties not to cause emotional and economic injuries. See,
e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285-86 (Me. 1987) (explaining
that "the exceptional vulnerability of the family of recent decedents makes it highly probable
that emotional distress will result from [negligently sending an amputated leg to decedent's son
with other of decedent's items]"); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. 1994) ("One can
reasonably foresee that people who enjoy an intimate familial relationship with one another will
be especially vulnerable to emotional injury resulting from a tragedy befalling one of them.");
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1983) (explaining that,
in a suit for economic harm, "[i]t is enough [to permit liability] that the maker of the
representation intends it to reach and influence either a particular person or persons, known to
him, or a group or class of persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be
expected sooner or later to have access to the information and foreseeably to take some action in
reliance upon it.").
103. 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989).
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speak in terms of a generalized, class-based foreseeability. Instead,
the court imposed a duty of due care in light of specific foreseeabilityrelated facts: 1) the defendant's knowledge that his paramour was
married, 2) the defendant's ability to foresee that his paramour would
have intercourse with her husband, 3) the paramour's lack of
knowledge or reason to know that she or the defendant had been
exposed to a venereal disease, and 4) the defendant's awareness, as a
doctor, of the likelihood of transmission of the venereal disease. 10 4 The
court's holding was therefore limited to imposing on that particular
defendant a duty to guard that particular plaintiff against harm. In
fact, the court was careful to reserve decision as to whether the
defendant, "subsequent to his affair with appellee's wife, will be liable
'10 5
to any and all persons with whom she may have sexual contact.
Whether plaintiff-foreseeability
(either
class-based
or
particular) is best determined by the judge (in the context of duty) or
the jury (in the context of proximate cause) is a matter left to
discussion in Part III below. 106
b. Foreseeabilityof Harm
Courts also frequently consider, in the context of duty, the
foreseeability of the type of harm or the manner in which harm
occurred-a practice which, as illustrated by Wagon Mound, is
redundant with parallel considerations in the context of proximate
10 8 for example, the California Court
cause. 10 7 In Bryant v. Glastetter,
of Appeal considered a claim by the surviving family of a tow truck
driver who was struck and killed by a third party as he attempted to
remove the defendant's car from the side of a freeway. 10 9 The police
had impounded the car upon the defendant's arrest for drunk driving.
The question before the court was whether the defendant owed a duty
to the decedent. 110 According to the court, the defendant clearly had a
duty not to drive drunk.11 1 In declining to impose a duty in this
particular case, however, the court focused both on unforeseeability of

104. Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 272.
105. Id. at 273.
106. See infra notes 293-305 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
108. 32 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
109. Id. at 774.
110. Id. at 776.
111. Id. at 777.
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the plaintiff' 12 and on the fact that "[t]he harm suffered by
decedent ... was not a 'harm of a kind normally to be expected' as a
consequence of negligent driving." 118 In other words, although the
defendant's conduct clearly created some risk of harm and was
therefore unreasonable, the type or manner of the harm that actually
occurred (being struck by a third party while removing the defendant's
impounded vehicle) was not foreseeable. For this reason, the court
determined that the defendant owed no duty to avoid causing such
114
injury.
Courts also sometimes consider under the auspices of duty the
foreseeable likelihood and severity of potential harm, or "foreseeable
risk." 5 Where injury was not a sufficiently likely consequence of the
defendant's conduct, or where the severity of foreseeable injury was
not particularly great, the judge will dismiss the case on grounds that
the defendant did not owe a duty of care." 6 The converse is also true,

112. For a discussion of this aspect of the court's opinion, see infra notes 195-199 and
accompanying text.
113. Bryant, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 779.
114. Id.; see also, e.g., Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582, 588-89 (Cal.
1997) (asking as a question of duty-in the context of a claim by a student molested by a viceprincipal who was recommended for the job by defendant, despite knowledge of prior charges of
sexual misconduct-whether "defendants reasonably [could] have foreseen that the
representations and omissions in their reference letters would result in physical injury to
someone").
115. See, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003) (citations
omitted):
All persons have a duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm. Whether a defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm to
others sufficiently foreseeable to charge the defendant with a duty to avoid such
conduct is a question of law ....
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 723 (Or. 1979) (en banc) (stating that a defendant owes
a duty where the defendant "creat[ed] a foreseeable risk of harm to others."); Greater Houston
Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990) (citing El Chicho Corp. v. Poole, 732
S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987)):
In determining whether a defendant was under a duty, the court will consider several
interrelated factors, including risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed
against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of
guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the
defendant ... [and] of all these factors foreseeability of risk is the "foremost and
dominant consideration."
See also Galligan, supra note 3, at 1511 (noting that some courts hold that "a person has a duty
to protect another whenever the risk to the other was sufficiently foreseeable that a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise ordinary care to avoid that risk").
116. See, e.g., Albert v. Hsu, 602 So. 2d 895, 898 (Ala. 1992) (holding that defendant
restaurant owner did not owe a duty to restaurant patron to protect patron from the
unforeseeable event of a car backing across a parking lot, over a curb, and through the wall of
the restaurant); Washington v. City of Chicago, 720 N.E.2d 1030, 1033-34 (Ill. 1999) (holding
that where plaintiff was struck by a truck which, deciding to skirt traffic, drove onto the shoulder
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as is illustrated by Judge Pollock's decision in Snyder v. American
Ass'n of Blood Banks.117 The plaintiff in Snyder contracted HIV from
a transfusion of contaminated blood provided by a member hospital of
the defendant American Association of Blood Banks ("AABB"). On
appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the primary issue
before the Supreme Court of New Jersey was whether the AABB owed
the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care. The court focused much of its
duty analysis on the "foreseeability of injury to others .... [and] the
nature of the risk posed by the defendant's conduct"-and specifically
on "the severity and foreseeability of the risk that blood transfusions
could spread the AIDS virus." 118 Finding the possibility that patients
might contract AIDS via contaminated transfusions to be foreseeable,
and finding the severity of harm caused by AIDS to be dire, the court
held that the AABB owed a duty to use reasonable precautions to
avoid causing such infections. 119
This use of foreseeable risk as a basis for deciding whether to
impose a duty has been roundly criticized for its usurpation of the
jury's role in deciding breach. 120 Further discussion of this point
appears in Parts III.B and IV.B below.
c. Public Policy under the Guise of Foreseeability
At its core, duty-the imposition upon a class of actors of an
obligation of certain conduct-inescapably involves matters of
policy. 121 Just as a legislature must consider the far-reaching effects
on the market when deciding whether to impose criminal liability for
and struck a median and planter box installed by defendant city, city had no duty because "the
accident ... was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the condition of the median").
117. 676 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1996).
118. Snyder, 676 A.2d at 1048.
119. Id. at 1048-49.
120. See, e.g., TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 4, § 7, cmt. i (stating that in some cases,
"courts improperly use no-duty determinations when they substitute their own evaluation of the
competing risks and burdens in a specific case for that of the factfinder, as long as reasonable
minds can differ"); DOBBS, supra note 11, § 227, at 580:
Possibly some courts are really using the no-duty locution as a convenient but
misleading way to decide the breach of duty issue .... deciding issues about costs,
benefits, and foreseeability that are normally jury questions. Worse, they might be
deciding those cases without the benefit of appropriate evidence about the costs and
benefits.
See also, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 713 (2001):
As many before us have pointed out .... courts, both knowingly and unwittingly,
sometimes decide what are surely breach questions under the guise of deciding the
question of 'duty'... thus surreptitiously shrink[ing] the scope of the rule stating
that the breach issue ordinarily is for the jury.
121. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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securities fraud, a court must consider the same when deciding
whether to impose a parallel civil tort duty. And just as a legislature
should take into account the effect on insurance premiums of a
proposed expansion of common-law malpractice liability, so might a
court.
A court is not a legislature, however, and concerns of
institutional competence and legitimacy loom large. Many courts feel
squeamish about deciding tort cases on the basis of reasoning that
arguably is proper only for the legislative branch. For this reason,
courts deciding negligence cases only reluctantly speak in terms of
public policy and instead often cloak policy-based reasoning in
doctrinal-sounding language. One favorite tool to this end is that
122
seemingly ubiquitous and ever-malleable concept, foreseeability.
Suits alleging "social host liability"-claims by a guest or third
party harmed as a result of the guest's consumption of alcohol
provided by a social host-serve as context for this use of
foreseeability. According to some courts, a social host case presents
the quintessential affirmative duty scenario. The issue for these
courts is whether the social host had an affirmative obligation to
prevent an inebriated guest from drinking excessively or from
engaging in dangerous conduct while drunk-usually driving or
assaulting another guest.1 23 In other courts, social host cases do not
implicate affirmative duties, but require application of the general
duty not to cause others harm. 124 The duty question in these courts is
whether to refrain from imposing a duty despite the fact that by
serving alcohol to guests, the social host creates a risk of harm.
With regard to either conception of the duty issue raised by
social host cases, the deciding factor for most courts is whether a
guest's intoxication and subsequent risk-laden conduct was
foreseeable to a reasonable person in the social host's position. In
Langle v. Kurkul,1 25 for example, the Supreme Court of Vermont
considered whether to impose on a social host a duty of reasonable
care in serving alcohol to a guest who was later injured while driving

122. See Kelley, supra note 2, at 1045 ("When judges refuse to recognize a duty in the teeth
of foreseeable harm to others, they are making an exception, on public policy grounds, to the
broad duty to avoid conduct threatening foreseeable harm to others.") (citing THE COMMON LAW,
supra note 21, at 91-103).
123. See, e.g., Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 P.2d 305, 310-312 (Utah 2000) (considering whether
the social host-guest relationship gives rise to a special relationship that imposes on the social
host an affirmative duty either to control or protect her guests).
124. See, e.g., McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 142 (Mass. 1986)
("Under traditional common law tort analysis, our inquiry is whether a social host violated a
duty to an injured third person by serving an alcoholic beverage to a guest ....
whether the
social host unreasonably created a risk of injury ... .
125. 510 A.2d 1301 (Vt. 1986).
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home. 126 The court held that "a social host has a duty of care only in
situations in which the host furnishes alcoholic beverages to someone
visibly intoxicated and 'it is foreseeable to the host that the guest will
thereafter drive an automobile .... " 127 Thus, the court's imposition
of a duty turned on the foreseeability of the plaintiffs drunk driving.
128
The imposition of any duty on social hosts is rare, however.
Most courts that address the issue as a matter of common law have
held that social hosts owe no duty at all to an intoxicated guest or to
third parties injured by such a guest, either because 1) social hosts as
a class cannot foresee how much alcohol a guest will consume and
cannot know when a guest has become intoxicated, 2) a host cannot
foresee or control an intoxicated guest's conduct, or 3) it is the guest
who is most able to avoid injuries resulting from the guest's
intoxication. 129
Courts' reliance on foreseeability when deciding a social host's
duty, however, is at best misguided and perhaps even disingenuous.
By deciding as a question of duty that the risks of serving alcohol are
not foreseeable and that a social host is unable to reduce those risks in
any event, courts in essence hold that the conduct of social hosts is
reasonable as a matter of law. In other words, such courts do not
really decide duty, but rather breach. 130 And to the extent that courts
decline to impose a duty because it is the guest who is primarily
responsible for creating the risks inherent in the excess consumption
of alcohol, such courts thereby adjudge proximate cause as a matter of
131
law, not duty.
Hence, the obvious question: why do courts in social host cases
decide foreseeability under the guise of duty when what they are

126. Langle, 510 A.2d at 1301.
127. Id. at 1306.
128. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 43, at 189 ("In the very few states in which courts
have found a duty on the part of a social host to a person hurt by the drinker, the legislatures
have quickly reinstated either complete immunity... or granted the social host very strong
protection ...").
129. E.g. Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 921-23 (Tex. 1993).
130. See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (expounding upon this point in the
context of Graff v.Beard).
131. See, e.g., Gabelsberger v. J.H., No. WD 63222, 2004 WL 832865, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr.
20, 2004) ("Under the common law, the consumption of alcohol by Defendant J.H. and his
voluntary intoxication was the proximate cause of Leslie's death, not the furnishing of the
alcoholic beverages to Defendant J.H. by Mr. Peters."); Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510 (Pa.
1983) (holding that it was the guest's consumption of alcohol, not the defendant's furnishing of it,
that proximately caused the relevant injury). It might also be argued that the court is in fact
imposing a form of contributory negligence in such cases-that the plaintiffs own negligence
precludes recovery. Still, such an argument would not account for cases in which the plaintiff is
not the intoxicated guest, but an innocent third party.
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really doing is deciding breach or proximate cause as a matter of law?
One possibility is that courts are confusing these three elements of the
negligence action. As this Article has shown, such is often the case.
And yet the overwhelming consistency with which courts dismiss
social host cases seems to indicate a more principled explanation.
Another possibility is that courts feel strongly that social host
liability cases ought to be dismissed upon motion for summary
judgment, but find it difficult to do so pursuant to the "no reasonable
jury" standard. It seems unlikely, for example, that a court could
bring itself to rule as a matter of law that a host acted reasonably in
serving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated guest whom the host knew
would drive home from the party. 132 Folding breach and proximate
cause questions into the duty inquiry is indeed a convenient way to
avoid such deference. Again, however, the virtual singularity of voice
with which courts denied social host liability leads one to question
why courts are so reluctant to let such cases reach a jury.
The answer lies in considerations more fundamental than
foreseeability and more categorical than risk or proximate causeconsiderations of broad public policy. 133 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey's decision in Kelly v. Gwinnell 34 is instructive. The issue in
Kelly was whether to impose a duty of reasonable care on a social host
who served alcohol to a guest despite knowledge that the guest was
intoxicated and that the guest planned to drive home. 135 In breaking
ranks with nearly every jurisdiction to consider the issue to date, the
court imposed such a duty and in doing so recognized that
determination of the question necessitated a choice between
competing social values:
We impose this duty on the host to the third party because we believe that the policy
considerations served by its imposition far outweigh those asserted in opposition. While
we recognize the concern that our ruling will interfere with accepted standards of social
behavior; will intrude on and somewhat diminish the enjoyment, relaxation, and
camaraderie that accompany social gatherings at which alcohol is served; and that such
gatherings and social relationships are not simply tangential benefits of a civilized
society but are regarded by many as important, we believe that the added assurance of
132. But see Clendening v. Shipton, 196 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (Cal. App. 1983):
Although foreseeability is most often a question of fact for the jury, when there is no
room for a reasonable difference of opinion, it may be decided as a question of law....
The question thus presented as to the general negligence cause of action is relatively
simple: Is there room for a reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the risk a
person served alcoholic beverages by a social host who attains some degree of
intoxication may assault and injure a third party?
133. See Linda E. Fisher, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms:Autonomy, the Common Good, and
the Courts, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 351, 370-73 (2000) (discussing opposing policy interests in
social host cases).
134. 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
135. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1221-22.
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just compensation to the victims of drunken driving as well as the added deterrent
effect
13 6
of the rule on such driving outweigh the importance of those other values.

Many more courts, however, are hesitant to admit to making
what some might argue is a choice more appropriate for the legislative
branch. Indeed, some courts faced with allegations of social host
liability expressly defer to the legislature. 137 More often, however, and
as illustrated above, courts simply fall back on discussion of that
staple ticket to judicial free-reign, foreseeability.
Courts' use of foreseeability in this way is not limited to cases
involving social host liability.
In cases involving sports-related
injuries, for example, courts often dismiss a plaintiffs negligence
claim by reference to foreseeability, whereas courts likely disfavor
such claims because they "might well stifle the rewards of athletic
competition."'138
Similarly, courts rely on foreseeability as a
convenient proxy for difficult policy decisions in the context of claims
for emotional distress 139 and allegations that a commercial landowner
140
failed to protect its patrons from third-party crime.
It is less important to discern courts' reasons for skirting the
policy decisions inherent in certain types of negligence cases than
merely to recognize that they do, and perhaps to consider why
foreseeability serves as such an attractive alternative. Foreseeability
provides ready shelter in such cases for several reasons. Because of
foreseeability's alignment with duty, it may be utilized without
deference to the jury. Furthermore, foreseeability provides some
136. Id. at 1224.
137. E.g., Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Co., 559 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1990); Boutwell v.
Sullivan, 469 So. 2d 526, 529 (Miss. 1985); Manning v. Andy, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (Pa. 1973).
138. Thompson v. McNeill, 559 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1990) (involving claim by a golfer who
had been struck in the head by an errant ball); see also Zurla v. Hydel, 681 N.E.2d 148, 149-52
(Ill. 1997) (discussing similar policy reasons in the context of hockey injury case). For cases in
which courts resolve similar cases by reference to foreseeability, see Hathaway v. Tascosa
Country Club, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that because risk of getting hit
with a golf ball is foreseeable, plaintiff may only recover pursuant to proof that defendant acted
recklessly or intentionally). The brand of foreseeability cited in such cases is, perhaps, yet
another distinct incarnation of the doctrine-foreseeability of injury from the plaintiffs
perspective, rather than that of the defendant. Some jurisdictions treat such questions as not
involving duty at all, but as requiring application of the arguably parallel doctrine of
"assumption of the risk." See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 43, at 469 (citing Murphy v.
Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929)).
139. See, e.g., Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., 534 A.2d 1282, 1284-85 (Me. 1987)
(using foreseeability as a proxy for a line drawn between the plaintiffs interest in recovering for
emotional injury, on the one hand, and the concern for administrative difficulties in proving and
measuring emotional injuries and the fear of a potential flood of litigation based on trivial
claims, on the other).
140. See, e.g., Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 766-68 (La. 1999) (citing
several approaches to such cases-all involving some form of foreseeability-as a convenient way
to balance landowners' rights and the interests of their patrons).
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measure of doctrinal legitimacy while 'remaining extraordinarily
flexible in the hands of a capable judge. Finally, foreseeability
involves the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, and
between those parties and the circumstances underlying the plaintiffs
claim--considerations squarely within a court's traditional power to
decide the case or controversy before it. Thus, foreseeability feels
safer than naked, legislative-like policy decisions.
Still, no matter how attractive foreseeability may be, to the
extent that it masks--or at the very least, distracts from--courts'
resolution of important policy concerns, it in fact endangers courts'
legitimacy, rather than protects it-a matter addressed more fully in
Part JV.A below.
III. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED RESTATEMENT ON NEGLIGENCE
DOCTRINE

A. The ProposedSection 7 General Duty Standard
As explained above, courts have for some time recognized the
general principle that one owes a duty to avoid unreasonably creating
a risk of physical harm to others. 14 1 Indeed, in many cases involving
conduct that caused physical injury, courts find little reason even to
discuss duty-a duty of reasonable care is presumed. 142 This general
principle of duty is not, however, accurately described as a rule of law.
Rather, it exists as a kind of default inclination from which courts
freely depart in light of any impetus not to hold a particular defendant
liable under the circumstances. 143 Perhaps for this reason, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts declined to include a black letter
statement of this general duty. 144 Instead, the Restatement Second
defined the duty inquiry in much narrower terms, as whether the
14 5
defendant invaded a "protected interest" of the plaintiff.
141. See supra note 57.
142. E.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 818 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In the usual run
of cases, a general duty to avoid negligence is assumed, and there is no need for the court to
undertake detailed analysis of precedent and policy."); TENTATIVE DRAFr No. 2, supra note 4, § 6,
cmt. f ("[I]n cases involving physical harm, courts ordinarily need not concern themselves with
the existence or content of this ordinary duty.").
143. See infra Parts IIB, C, D, and E for examples.
144. The Restatement Second's Comments and Reporter's Notes did, however, recognize the
principle of the general duty of care. See RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 19, § 4, cmt. b
("[T]he actor, if he acts at all, must exercise reasonable care to make his acts safe for others.");
id. topic 4 (Scope Note) ("[N]ormally, when there is an affirmative act which affects the interests
of another, there is a duty not to be negligent with respect to the doing of the act.").
145. Id. § 281.
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The initial drafts of the proposed Restatement Third also did
not include an affirmative statement of the duty not to cause physical
harm to another, but for a very different reason. The initial drafts
proposed an account of negligence absent the element of duty
altogether. 146 Discussion Draft No. 2, for example, described the
prima facie case as follows: "An actor is subject to liability for
negligent conduct that is a legal cause of physical harm." 147 Indeed,
the section of that initial draft labeled "Duty" read only in the
negative:
Even if the defendant's negligent conduct is the legal cause of the plaintiffs physical
harm, the [defendant] is not liable for that harm if the court determines that the
defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff. Findings of no duty are unusual, and are based
on judicial recognition of special problems of principle or policy that justify the
withholding of liability. 148

As some critics have noted, duty stated as such merely "refers
to the failure of a defendant who is already presumed or found to have
committed the tort of negligence to obtain a judicial exemption from
the liability that a negligent actor ordinarily incurs."1 49
The proposed effect of the early drafts was clear. Negligence
cases involving physical injury were not to be decided by judges,
except in the face of "special problems of principle or policy" or where
no reasonable jury could find otherwise.
Notwithstanding the
potential merits of such a proposal, the initial drafts' abrogation of
duty sparked strong criticism and was ultimately abandoned (or at
least repackaged), likely because it offered a flawed positive account of
negligence law.1 50 Contrary to what the drafts proposed, virtually all
courts do give content to duty as a prima facie element of negligence,
and most courts reserve a substantial role for the judge in deciding
151
negligence cases.

146. The initial drafting process of the proposed Restatement Third was taken up by Harvey
Perlman and Gary Schwartz, each of whom drafted substantially overlapping provisions. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES §§ 2A, 9A, 3, 6, 18-23, and 101-05

(Discussion Draft No. 2, 2000) [hereinafter DISCUSSION DRAFT No. 2] (drafted by Schwartz);
RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2000) (drafted by
Perlman).
147. DISCUSSION DRAFT No. 2, supra note 146, § 3; see also id. § 101 ("An actor has a legal
obligation, in the conduct of the actor's own affairs, to act reasonably to avoid causing legally
cognizable harm to another.").
148. Id. § 6.
149. Goldberg & Zipursky,, supra note 120, at 658.
150. See generally id. (criticizing the early drafts for their failure to describe accurately
negligence law and for their abandon of the necessary and useful concept of duty).
151. See id. at 736 ("The Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles has studiously
avoided the concept of duty and the language expressing it. In doing so, it has disempowered
itself from restatingour actual law .... ").
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Section 7(a) of the current draft of the Restatement Third
departs from both the initial drafts and from the Restatement Second
by stating explicitly that "[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise
reasonable care when that actor's conduct creates a risk of physical
harm. ' 152 The inclusion of this affirmative account of duty apparently
assuaged the concerns of many who dissented from the previous
drafts, and a version of this language was approved preliminarily by
vote of the ALI in May, 2002, thereby becoming official ALI policy.
On its face, the Section 7(a) standard is limited in two respects.
First, Section 7(a) is limited to a consideration of "conduct," defined as
"some affirmative act," 153 as opposed to a failure to rescue, protect, or
warn against danger created by another source.1 54 The potential
existence of a duty under the latter circumstances is covered by
subsequent sections of the proposed Restatement.1 55 Second, Section
7(a) is limited to cases involving physical harm to person or property.
Negligence cases involving economic or psychic harm are to be
1 56
governed by another set of Restatement provisions yet to be drafted.
The crux of the Section 7(a) duty lies in the meaning of conduct
that "creates a risk." Perhaps most telling is what is absent from this
phrase. Section 7(a) does not state that a duty is owed where an
actor's conduct creates a risk of harm "to the plaintiff." Nor does
Section 7(a) impose a duty only where an actor creates a "foreseeable"
risk. Indeed, Section 7(a) is not in any way conditioned on
foreseeability.
Until a recent amendment; not yet approved by the full body of
the ALI, the black letter "creates a risk" standard remained largely
unelaborated (which perhaps explains why Section 7(a) gained the
preliminary approval of the Institute). The most current draft
Comment a to Section 7(a), however, now explains that "[w]hen the
actor's conduct is a factual cause of physical harm, the actor's conduct
necessarily 'created a risk' of harm."1 57 Thus, taking Section 7(a) and

152. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 7(a).
153. Id. § 6, cmt. f.
154. Perhaps Justice Cardozo enunciated the distinction best as "whether the putative
wrongdoer has advanced to such a point as to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or
has stopped where inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument for good." H.R. Moch
Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898-99 (N.Y. 1928).
155. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 4, supra note 5, §§ 37-45.
156. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 4, introductory note. Although cases involving
physical injury stemming from landowner liability and medical malpractice are also to be
considered by separate, yet-unwritten portions of the Restatement Third, the issues discussed in
this Article play out very similarly in such cases. Indeed, significant parallels may be made to
emotional and economic injury cases as well.
157. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 7, cmt. a.
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Comment a together, where a defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff
physical harm, the defendant owed a duty to have acted reasonably in
so doing.
At first blush, this standard for duty appears unobjectionable,
perhaps even prosaic.
As explained above, courts have long
recognized the general principle that one must avoid causing physical
injury to others. What is revolutionary (if subtly so) about Section 7(a)
is that it restates this general principle as black letter law. The ALI
thereby urges courts to embrace the Section 7(a) duty standard not
merely as a default inclination, but as a substantive rule from which
courts should depart only in exceptional circumstances.
Indeed,
Section 7(b) explicitly states as much:
A court may determine that an actor has no duty or has a duty other than the ordinary
duty of reasonable care. Determinations of no duty and modifications of the duty of
reasonable care are exceptional. They are based on special problems of principle or
policy that warrant denying
liability, or modifying the ordinary duty of care, in a
15 8
particular class of cases.

The comments to Section 7 make abundantly clear that no-duty
cases are narrow categorical exceptions to the general duty rule and
that the Section 7(a) standard is to determine duty in the usual
case. 159 This presumption is so strong, in fact, that Comment b to
Section 7 places the burden on the defendant, rather than the
plaintiff, to raise the possibility that an exception to the general duty
160
is applicable in a particular case.
The comments to Section 7 list the various circumstances in
which a court might decide not to impose a duty notwithstanding the
fact that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiffs injury. The
comments reflect many of the circumstances in which courts currently
do so: for example, where imposing a duty would conflict with an
established social norm, 16 1 or where the general duty would conflict

158. Id. § 7(b).
159. See id. § 6, cmt. a ("Except in unusual categories of cases in which courts have
developed no-duty rules, an actor's duty to exercise reasonable care does not require attention
from the court."); id. § 7, cmt. a ("In most cases, courts can rely directly on § 7 and need not refer
to duty on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, in some categories of cases, reasons of principle or
policy dictate that liability should not be imposed."). In the Reporters' Notes to Comment a, the
Reporters cite Stagl v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 52 F.3d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.)
(applying New York law), for the proposition that "judicial power to modify" the general duty
rule "is reserved for very limited situations."
160. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, supra note 4, § 7, cmt. b; see also id., § 7 cmt. b (Reporter's
Note) (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Form 9 as evidence that federal courts do not
require a plaintiff to plead duty where the plaintiff pleads that defendant's negligence caused
physical harm).
161. Id. § 7, cmt. c.
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with another body of law. 162 Notably absent from these comments is
an exception to the Section 7(a) duty for lack of foreseeability.
Should courts take Section 7 seriously and impose a duty
whenever a defendant "created a risk" of physical injury, courts will
have adopted what is indeed an inclusive standard. This is especially
true in light of Comment a's instruction that a duty necessarily arises
where the defendant was a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury.
Consider, for instance, application of Section 7(a) to the following
hypothetical: A, an independent and responsible adult, receives a new
car as a gift from his parents-a gift that he would not have been able
to afford on his own. A later broadsides B's car at an intersection. B
sues not only A, but also A's parents, who were out of the country at
the time of the accident. Most courts today would dismiss B's suit
against A's parents at the first opportunity, likely on the grounds that
A's parents owed no applicable duty. A's parents were in no way
responsible for their grown son's behavior. They had no reason to
believe that A might drive dangerously and had nothing to do with the
accident itself.
A court applying Section 7(a) of the proposed Restatement,
however, would likely not dismiss B's suit for lack of duty. Absent
some exceptional conflicting "problem of principle or policy," A's
parents owed a duty pursuant to Section 7(a) because their conductgiving the car to A-created a risk that A would crash into B's car.
Similarly, in the language of Comment a to Section 7, A's parents
owed a duty because their conduct was a factual cause of B's injurybut for A's parents' having given the car to A, B would not have been
injured. A's parents therefore owed a duty of reasonable care.
B's suit against A's parents would, of course, be thrown out
nevertheless, even by a court applying the proposed Restatement
Third-not for lack of duty, however. The court would be forced to
rule either 1) that A's parents owed no duty due to some "special
problem of policy or principle" pursuant to Section 7(b); 2) that as a
matter of law A's parents' conduct was not unreasonable, and
therefore that they did not breach their duty; or 3) that as a matter of
law the conduct of A's parents was not a proximate cause of B's
injuries.
In light of this hypothetical, it might be argued that the
"creates a risk" standard renders duty a nullity in most negligence
cases. If duty is satisfied by mere factual causation, then duty is
redundant as an element of negligence and the current draft of the
proposed Restatement is no better than the initial drafts, which
162. Id. § 7, cmt. d.

772

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:739

contained no duty element at all. Such an argument misses the mark,
however. Section 7(a) does not represent an abrogation of duty, but
rather reflects a strong form of a duty that has been collectively
derived by courts from the stuff of which duty is comprisedconsiderations of public policy and community norms of obligation.
That is, courts have come to a collective decision that one owes a duty
not to unreasonably cause physical harm to another. Thus, although
adoption of Section 7(a) may mean that judges do less fundamental
duty analysis in a particular case, it is not because Section 7(a)
renders such analysis irrelevant. It is because the work has already
been done. Judicial consideration of duty over the decades, and
perhaps centuries, has culminated in the rule recognized by Section
7(a).
Still, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, the shift of the
Section 7(a) duty from default inclination to presumptive rule will
work a significant change in many courts' understanding and
treatment of negligence doctrine. Section 7(a) is thus potentially
subject to another of the criticisms of the Restatement's initial
drafts-that it exceeds the ALI's mandate to simply restate the law.
Three responses to such criticism seem apt. First, the shift in doctrine
effected by Section 7(a) is not as jarring as that proposed by the initial
drafts.
Defining negligence without duty would have rendered
incomprehensible significant bodies of settled negligence law, such as
affirmative duties. 163 The ALI's current proposal, by contrast, only
crystallizes into a black letter rule courts' existing understanding of
the general structure of duty.
Second, although Section 7(a)
represents a significant shift in doctrinal emphasis, the change will
have only a subtle effect on the substantive outcome of negligence
cases-a point explored in Part IV below.
Third, and most
importantly, it is neither possible nor desirable for a Restatement
merely to describe tort law. Negligence especially is a jumbled
Diaspora, with courts endorsing a variety of approaches to almost
every issue from proximate cause to apportionment of liability. The
Restatement must make judgments not only about what courts do, but
also about what works best. 164 Indeed, the very purpose of a
163. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 120, at 678 (asserting that "there are two
particular categories of these cases--'duty to warn' and 'duty not to increase the risk of plaintiff
suffering harm by a third party tortfeasor'-that cannot be captured without using the concept of
duty in its obligation sense").
164. See,e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, § B19, cmt. c

(Reporter's Note) (explaining the Reporters' choice, among approaches taken by various
jurisdictions, to allow a percentage of responsibility to be assigned to identified nonparties in
several liability states); RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 19, introductory cmt., at ix
(explaining that one of the purposes of a Restatement is to push courts toward a more effective
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Restatement since its Langdellian-formalist origins 165 is to bring
clarity to the law, not simply to reflect it, and to strengthen the rule of
166
law by nudging courts toward greater consistency and uniformity.
If ever there were need for greater clarity and consistency, it is
in the context of duty, and particularly duty's relationship with
foreseeability. The Comments and Reporters' Notes to Sections 6 and
7 of the proposed Restatement, however, say little about
foreseeability, with two significant exceptions to be discussed in Parts
III.C and D below. And yet the most significant doctrinal impact of
Section 7 is its implicit effect on duty and foreseeability. Should
courts apply Section 7 at its face value, duty will largely be purged of
the morass that is foreseeability. Section 7 accomplishes this task in
four ways: 1) it forces judges to consider foreseeability of harm
system of law); Kelley, supra note 2, at 1055 (arguing that "a methodology that accepts as
equally valid and equally relevant all judicial decisions on the topic... precludes a single, clear
statement of the law . . . [and] provides no basis for determining that some cases are right, or
better-reasoned than other cases"); Victor E. Schwartz, Products Liability-The American Law
Institute's Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFsTRA L. REV. 743, 745 (1998)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Products Liability] (explaining that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
"was shaped more by the Reporters' and advisory committee's evaluation of the wisdom of
competing case law than a presumption to follow 'clear majority' rules"). See also Reporter Gary
Schwartz's words on this topic:
The entire project of undertaking a Restatement is based on the perception that there
is some significant amount of confusion out there in the cases ....
it is only because
of the recognition of confusion that the sense emerges that a new Restatement might
be helpful to the legal community. Given all of this, it is the job of Restatement
reporters essentially to immerse themselves in the case law and then come up with
some sort of structure that makes sense ....
In this regard, the ground rules that the
American Law Institute provides could not be clearer. Under those ground rules, it is
entirely within the province of reporters, having identified what may be only a
minority rule, to endorse that rule as the Restatement position-if they in fact
conclude that it is the better rule.
Gary Schwartz, Part II. TraditionalRestatement or Harbingerof Policy Changes?: The Nature of
the New Restatement, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 43, 43-44 (1998).
165. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from
Century's End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1999) (explaining that the ALI's Restatement projects
emerged from the turn-of-the-century legal formalism associated with Dean Langdell of Harvard
Law School).
166. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT CONFLICT OF LAWS viii-ix (1934) (citing the purpose of the
Restatement as "certainty and clarity"); Patricia M. Monaghan, Case Comment, Trends in New
Mexico Law: 1994-95: Tort Law-Supreme Court Permits Design Defect Claims in Both Strict
Liability and Negligence: Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 26 N.M. L. REV. 629, 639-40 (1996)
("The primary purpose of the Restatement (Third) of Torts is to bring greater certainty,
consistency, and predictability into the law .. "); Harvey S. Perlman, Part IV: Other Key
Provisions: Section 3's Circumstantial Evidence Rule: Can It Cure the Defects in Section 2?, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 99, 99 n.3 (1998) ('The reporters had an understandable desire to 'set
straight' and clarify a body of judicial opinions [in products liability law] that they properly
regarded as chaotic. The purpose of a Restatement, after all, is to bring some consistency and
coherence to the reported cases .... ); Schwartz, Products Liability, supra note 164, at 743 ("The
American Law Institute... was founded in 1923 to bring coherence, reason, and consistency to
state judge-made law.").
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pursuant to the "no reasonable jury" standard in light of the specific
facts of the case, rather than more generally in the context of duty; 2)
it draws a meaningful line for judges considering whether
foreseeability of the plaintiff is an issue of duty or proximate cause; 3)
it brings into the realm of the general duty not to harm others certain
cases that commonly are decided-at least in part by reference to
foreseeability-in the context of affirmative duties to warn, protect, or
rescue; and 4) it encourages courts that make certain types of
legislative-like policy exceptions to negligence liability to do so
expressly, rather than by reference to foreseeability. The following
Sections elaborate on each of these effects in turn.
Author's Note: During the editing of this Article, the Reporters
of the ALI issued a new draft of the proposed Restatement Third,
entitled Council Draft No. 5.167 This new draft expressly "rejects
reliance on unforeseeability by courts as a basis for determining that
no duty exists," 168 relying in large part on the reasoning expressed in
this article. 169 The ALI preliminarily approved of this change (and
others) during its May, 2005 annual meeting.
B. From "No Duty" to "No Breach as a Matter of Law"
The element of breach requires a jury to decide the defendant's
blameworthiness-whether the defendant's conduct conformed to the
duty owed. 170 Foreseeability of the risk created by a defendant's
conduct-that is, the likelihood and severity of potential harm-is
central to determining the reasonableness of that conduct, and
therefore to deciding breach. As demonstrated in Part III.C.2.b above,
however, courts frequently conflate the breach analysis with that of
duty. Indeed, many courts have even enshrined this amalgamation of
duty and breach in a general duty standard. In Kentucky, for
example, "[t]he rule is that every person owes a duty to every other
person to exercise ordinary care in his activities to prevent foreseeable

167. RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL

HARM (BASIC

PRINCIPLES)

(Council Draft No. 5, 2004) [hereinafter COUNCIL DRAFT No. 5].
168. Id. § 7 cmt. h.
169. See id. § 7, cmt. h & cmt. h (Reporter's Notes) (explaining the reasons for the change
and stating that: "This comment was not contained in the original version of this Section in
Tentative Draft No. 1. However, an article written after Tentative Draft No. 1 makes an
attractive case for removing the foreseeability of the risk from duty determinations. See W.
Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the
ProposedRestatement of Torts,__ VAND. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2005).").
170. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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injury." 171 In other words, if the risk created by one's activities was
not foreseeable, then the defendant owed no duty to act reasonably in
creating that risk. 172 In other states, foreseeable risk is just one of
several factors in determining duty, although it is often described as
73
the most important factor.
By contrast, Section 7(a) imposes a duty of reasonableness
where the defendant created any risk, no matter how unforeseeable,
unlikely, or innocuous. This point is particularly clear in light of
Comment a's explanation that if a defendant's conduct was a factual
cause of the plaintiffs harm, the defendant necessarily created a
risk. 1 74
Thus, even if it was completely unforeseeable that a
defendant's conduct would result in injury, where the defendant's
conduct did so the defendant had a duty of reasonable care. In short,
risk-foreseeability plays no part in the Section 7(a) duty analysis.
Application of Section 7(a) to the facts of Snyder v. American
Ass'n of Blood Banks, discussed above, 175 is illustrative. In Snyder,
the court imposed a duty on the defendant AABB only after finding
that the possibility that patients might contract HIV via contaminated
transfusions was foreseeable and that the harm caused by AIDS is

171. Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 3738, Inc. v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328,
332 (Ky. 1987) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001,
1006 (N.H. 2003) ("Whether a defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm to others sufficiently
foreseeable to charge the defendant with a duty to avoid such conduct is a question of law.");
Zanine v. Gallagher, 497 A.2d 1332, 1334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (noting that "the general duty
imposed on all persons not to place others at risk of harm through their actions ....
is limited to
those risks that are reasonably foreseeable"); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d
764, 766 (Wis. 1974) ("A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it was
foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone.").
172. This approach holds some intuitive appeal and might indeed be differentiated from the
risk-foreseeability inquiry that informs breach.
It might be argued, for example, that
foreseeability in the context of duty is merely an I/O switch-if some injury was foreseeable, then
the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care; if not, then no duty. Risk-foreseeability in the
context of breach, on the other hand, might be characterized as an inquiry not into whether
injury was foreseeable, but rather into how foreseeable it was-the more foreseeable the injury,
the more is required of the defendant to satisfy the reasonableness standard. Such an account is
flawed, however, for two reasons. First, one might equally explain a court's finding that injury
was completely unforeseeable as part of a determination that defendant's actions were
reasonable as a matter of law. Second, an account of duty that encompasses foreseeability
typically leads the court to decide a matter best left to the jury. See infra Part IV.B. Of course, a
court might address this latter concern by directing the foreseeability determination to the jury.
Unfortunately, courts do not often take such a course. In any event, leaving risk-foreseeability to
the element of breach is a much cleaner solution.
173. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (listing
"foreseeability of harm" as one of several factors to be considered in determining whether to
impose a duty).
174. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 7 cmt. a.
175. See supranotes 117-119 and accompanying text.
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severe. 176 Had the court approached the question of duty pursuant to
Section 7(a), it would have focused only on whether the AABB's
conduct created the risk of contaminated blood transfusion. (Indeed,
the proposed Restatement implies that this aspect of the duty inquiry
177
would not be for the court, but a question of fact for the jury. ) If it
were found that the AABB's conduct contributed causally to Mr.
Snyder's harm, or even created a risk of such harm, then the AABB
owed a duty to have acted reasonably. Only at that point might riskforeseeability become relevant, although not to the existence of a duty,
but with regard to the jury's determination of breach. The court may,
of course, decide that the risk the AABB created was foreseeable, and
therefore unreasonable as a matter of law. Rather than reaching such
a conclusion carte blanche, however, the court would have to hold that
reasonable jurors could not differ in their judgment of the matter.
In Snyder, the use of Section 7(a) likely would not have
changed the outcome of the court's duty analysis, only the method by
which the court reached its conclusion. Section 7(a) will have a
substantive effect on some duty determinations, however, as analysis
of the Supreme Court of Texas's decision in Graff v. Beard178
demonstrates. In Graff, the victim of a drunk driver sued the social
host who served the driver alcohol.' 79 In considering whether to
impose a duty on the social host, the court noted that "[a]mong other
factors, we consider the extent of the risk involved, 'the foreseeability
and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's
conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury,
and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant."' 8 0 In
weighing these factors, the court concluded that a social host does not
owe a duty because (1) a social host cannot know when a guest has
become intoxicated, (2) the intoxicated guest is in a better position to
foresee the risk he poses, and (3) the burden on the social host of
preventing the guest from driving once intoxicated is too great and
fraught with uncertainties.'18
Were the Graff case decided pursuant to Section 7(a) of the
proposed Restatement, the court almost certainly would have held
176. Snyder v. Ass'n of Am. Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1048-49 (N.J. 1996).
177. Although the proposed Restatement does not specify whether judge or jury is to
determine whether the defendant "created a risk," § 7, Comment b states that "[w]hen resolution
of disputed adjudicative facts bears on the existence of a duty, the case should be submitted to
the jury with alternative instructions." TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 4, § 7, cmt b.
178. 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993).
179. Id. at 918.
180. Id. at 920 (quoting Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.
1990)).
181. Id. at 921.
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that the social host owed a duty. The host's conduct-serving alcohol
to a guest who drove to the party--certainly created a risk of harm.
And the host's conduct was a factual cause of the plaintiffs injurybut for the host's serving alcohol to the guest, the plaintiff would likely
not have been injured. The defendant social host therefore owed a
duty of reasonable care without regard to risk-foreseeability.
The court might yet feel that a social host should not be held
liable, however, and it would have three options to rule thus. It might
find as a matter of law that because the risks were not foreseeable or
the burden of prevention too great, the defendant did not breach its
duty. The court might also find as a matter of law that the guest's
reckless behavior in driving drunk was a superseding cause, therefore
destroying proximate cause.18 2 Finally, as explained more fully in
Part III.E below, the court might decline to impose a duty pursuant to
Section 7(b), recognizing a "special problem of policy" in the public's
interest in having social gatherings at which alcohol is served without
fear of liability. 8 3 In none of these possible scenarios, however, would
the court decide risk-foreseeability without proper deference to the
jury's traditional function in deciding breach and proximate cause.
The proposed Restatement recognizes the impropriety of courts'
analysis of risk-foreseeability as a matter of duty. As Comment i to
Section 7 explains:
Sometimes ....
courts take the question of negligence [breach] away from the jury and
determine that the party was or was not negligent as a matter of law. Courts
sometimes express this result in terms of duty. Here, the rubric of duty inaccurately
conveys the impression that the court's decision is separate from and antecedent to the
issue of negligence. In fact, these cases merely reflect the one-sidedness of the facts
bearing on negligence, and should not be treated as cases
involving exemption from or
18 4
modification of the ordinary duty of reasonable care.

Comment i may fall short, however, of endorsing a complete
separation of duty and breach. Even when reasonable minds might
differ as to foreseeable risk and the burden of risk prevention,
Comment i suggests that a court may decide the case under the rubric
182. Such a result would be unlikely in view of the proximate cause, or "scope of liability"
section of the proposed Restatement Third. Pursuant to § 29 of TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, "[a]n
actor is not liable for harm different from the harms whose risks made the actor's conduct
tortious." Because a car crash is a harm whose risk made providing driving guests with alcohol
unreasonable, the plaintiffs claim would satisfy proximate cause.
183. See infra notes 233-239 and accompanying text.
184. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 4, § 7 cmt. i; see also id. § 7 cmt. i (Reporters' Notes)
(explaining that when what is meant is the application of the negligence standard to a particular
factual situation, "this is a misuse that is unfortunately common in judicial opinions. The
confusion that the terminology of duty frequently brings about provides another reason for
recommending that this terminology be deployed only in those particular cases where the
terminology has a distinct role to play.").
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of duty when those factors are amenable to analysis "from the
perspective of the entire categories of plaintiffs and defendants," and
where such categorical analysis implicates a greater "overall social
impact.., on a class of actors."'8 5 This portion of Comment i is both
unnecessary and ill-advised. It is unnecessary because the potential
for an adverse "overall social impact" falls squarely within the
province of Section 7(b)'s provision that a court may decline to impose
a duty due to special problems of principle or policy.
More
importantly, the comment is ill-advised to the extent that it
encourages courts to ignore the plain text of Section 7(a) and to
reconsider duty in light of risk-foreseeability. As explained more fully
in Part IV below, foreseeability is an especially fact-dependent
inquiry, not susceptible to categorical analysis. An injury that is not
foreseeable under one set of circumstances may be foreseeable under
even a slightly different scenario.' 8 6 Thus, the proper forum for
judicial consideration of risk-foreseeability is in the context of breach,
pursuant to the deferential "no reasonable jury" standard.
C. Resolution of the Palsgraf Question
Even where a defendant's conduct was unreasonable because
injury of some kind was to some degree foreseeable, the defendant
may yet escape liability if the conduct resulted in injury to an
unforeseeable person. Some courts, following the lead of Justice
Andrews's dissent in Palsgraf,leave plaintiff-foreseeability to the jury
in the context of proximate cause. 8 7 Other courts, often citing Justice
Cardozo's majority opinion in Palsgraf, instead consider plaintiffforeseeability to be a question of duty-the more foreseeable the
plaintiff, the greater the reason to impose a duty on defendant to
88
guard against injuring that plaintiff.
The disarray in negligence cases surrounding the so-called
"Palsgraf question" is replete.
Many courts seemingly analyze
plaintiff-foreseeability as a matter of duty in one case and proximate
cause in the next,' 8 9 and even in the context of both duty and
185. Id. § 7 cmt. i.
186. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927) (prescribing, in
a case involving a plaintiff hit by a train at an unguarded railway crossing, a duty to get out of
one's car and assess the possibility of approaching trains), with Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S.
98, 102 (1934) (limiting Goodman to its facts due to plaintiffs correct contention that, in light of
the circumstances of this case, getting out of his car may have actually increased the risk of
being hit by an approaching train). This case is discussed at length infra Part IV.
187. See supra note 95.
188. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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proximate cause in the same case. 190 Although a few torts scholars
propose that the modern trend is toward resolution of plaintiffforeseeability under proximate cause rather than duty, 19 1 the question
is certainly ripe for restatement. The proposed Restatement explicitly
addresses the issue and chooses proximate cause.
The Reporters' Notes to Section 29 (the section that defines
"scope of liability," or proximate cause) state that under the proposed
Restatement, "[plaintiff-foreseeability] is dealt with as a matter of
scope of liability rather than duty ....
,192 One need not rely on the
Reporters' Notes, however. The black letter text of Section 7(a)
requires such a conclusion. Consider, for example, how application of
Section 7(a) might have affected the court's duty analysis in
Mussivand v. David, 93 discussed in Part II.C.2.b above. The issue
before the Mussivand court was whether the defendant adulterer
owed a duty to avoid causing a sexually transmitted disease to be
passed to the spouse of his adulteress. The court imposed such a duty,
but only upon finding that it was foreseeable that the adulteress
might transmit the disease to her spouse. 194 Had the court utilized
Section 7(a), it would have arrived at its conclusion without reference
to foreseeability. The adulterer's conduct created a risk of harm and
indeed caused the plaintiffs harm, whether the plaintiff was
foreseeable or not.
The court's discussion of the defendant's
knowledge of his paramour's marriage and the foreseeability that she
would have intercourse with her husband may well have had a place
in the court's discussion of proximate cause (and would surely play a
role in the jury's determination of breach); however, in light of Section
7(a), it would be superfluous to an analysis of duty.
The effects of Section 7(a) are set in even more dramatic relief
by its application to the facts of Bryant v. Glastetter.195 Recall 96 that
Bryant involved a claim brought by the surviving family of a tow truck
driver, who was struck and killed by a third party as he attempted to
remove the defendant drunk driver's impounded car from the side of a

190. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT 186 (2d ed.

1998).
192. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 30, § 29 cmt. m (Reporters' Notes); see also
TENTATIVE DRAFr No. 2, supra note 4, § 6 cmt. f (Reporters' Notes) ("Modern scholars tend to
classify the issue of the foreseeable plaintiff under the general holding of proximate cause, as
does this Restatement in Chapter 6.").
193. 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989).
194. Mussivand, 544 N.E.2d at 321.
195. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4th 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
196. See supranotes 108-114 and accompanying text.
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freeway. 197
Citing the importance to duty analysis of "the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff' (and thus adopting a
Cardozoan/relational approach to duty), the court declined to impose a
duty, at least in part because the defendant could not have foreseen
that her consumption of alcohol would result in harm to the
decedent. 198 By driving drunk, however, the defendant created a risk
of harm.
Indeed, the court expressly found this risk. 199 The
defendant's conduct was also a cause in fact of the tow truck driver's
death. Thus, had the court applied Section 7(a) to these facts, it
clearly would have imposed a duty on the defendant. Of course, the
court may still have dismissed the plaintiffs case, even by reference to
the concept of foreseeability. Such analysis, however, likely would
have rested on a judgment that the plaintiffs claim failed proximate
cause as a matter of law. In this way, Section 7(a) purges duty of
plaintiff-foreseeability, pushing consideration of the concept into the
realm of proximate cause.
Although the proposed Restatement does offer some
explanation as to why courts should not analyze reasonableness under
the context of duty, such explanation is lacking when it comes to
plaintiff-foreseeability. The current draft merely states its intention
that it be so. One might argue that if, pursuant to Section 7(a), we all
owe a duty to the world not unreasonably to create a risk of injury to
others, then perhaps there is nothing left to decide in the context of
proximate cause regarding the foreseeability of a particular plaintiff.
Perhaps the ALI means to endorse an utterly non-relational concept of
duty. 20 0 Or perhaps the Reporters doubt the very existence of the
concept of foreseeability of plaintiff. In fact, the Reporters' Notes do
suggest that cases like Palsgraf, which purportedly turn on the
foreseeability of the plaintiff, might also be characterized as involving
the foreseeability of type or manner of harm. 20 1 Perhaps the most
convincing reason for leaving plaintiff-foreseeability to proximate
cause is that the inquiry is best left, as an initial matter, to the jury
rather than the judge-a point explored at length in Part IV below.
197. Bryant, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 292.
198. Id. at 294-96.
199. Id. at 295.
200. This explanation seems unlikely, especially in light of the proposed Restatement's
treatment of certain affirmative duties. Indeed, even a "duty to the world," as expressed in
Section 7 is relational-it is simply tied to a very large class of persons. Goldberg & Zipursky,
supra note 69, at 1809, 1822-24.
201. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 30, § 29, cmt. m (Reporters' Note) (suggesting
that Palsgrafand similar cases do not necessarily turn on plaintiff-foreseeability but might just
as easily be characterized as foreseeability of harm cases); see also William Powers, Jr.,
Reputology, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1941, 1949 (1991) (same).
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Bryant v. Glastetter illustrates yet another way in which
Section 7(a) cleanses duty of foreseeability. The Bryant court's duty
reasoning moves readily between discussion of plaintiff-foreseeability
and foreseeability of the type and manner of the plaintiffs harm,
ultimately declining to impose a duty on both grounds. 20 2 The court
declined to impose a duty because not only was it unforeseeable that
the defendant's drunk driving would injure the plaintiff tow truck
driver, but also because it was unforeseeable that defendant's drunk
driving would cause another injury via collision with a third party
while removing the defendant's impounded vehicle. If foreseeability of
the type and manner of harm is conceptually distinct from plaintiffforeseeability-and there is some question on the matter 2 3-it is clear
that implementation of Section 7(a) would have a similar effect on
both analyses, pushing both squarely under the proximate cause
umbrella. In Bryant, for example, the defendant owed a duty under
Section 7(a) because her conduct created a risk of harm, regardless of
the manner in which harm in fact occurred. Were the court to hold
that the type or manner of the decedent's harm was not foreseeable,
the court might dismiss the case on the ground that no reasonable
jury could find that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of
the decedent's injuries.
D. From Affirmative Duties to the General Duty of Reasonable Care
The two previous subsections suggest that the proposed
Restatement Third's general duty provision shifts courts' analyses of
foreseeability of harm and foreseeability of plaintiff from the construct
of duty to that of breach and proximate cause. Subsections D and E,
infra, focus on two related doctrinal shifts-shifts that will also have
an important, if somewhat less direct, impact on the role of
foreseeability in negligence cases. The first of these is the effect of
Section 7(a) on cases involving affirmative duties.
As a counterpart to the general duty to avoid unreasonably
creating a risk, defendants generally owe no duty to protect, warn, or
202. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
203. As the proposed Restatement points out, the line dividing the two concepts is slippery, if
not altogether illusory. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 30, § 29, cmt. m (Reporters'
Note) (noting that "the Palsgraf case could have been readily resolved without reference to the
unforeseeability of the plaintiff: the harm that occurred-injury due to the concussive force of an
explosion-was quite different from the risk that made the actor negligent-some breakage of
the package's contents upon hitting the ground"). For a somewhat different view, see John C.P.
Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L.R. 1315, 1336-42 (2003)
(offering an explanation for the difference based on tort law's general requirement of a "wronging
of the plaintiff').
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rescue another from risks.created by another source. 20 4 For example,
should Person A drive by the scene of a car accident in which Person B
has been injured, Person A generally owes no duty to aid Person B and
is free to drive past without rendering assistance. Courts recognize
several narrow categories of exceptions to this rule, however. For
example, if Person A were the coach of a high school tennis team on its
way to a match and if Person B were one of those players, a court
might impose on Person A a duty to rescue Person B due to their
"special relationship."' 20 5 Or where Person A non-negligently caused
Person B's accident, a court will typically impose on Person A the duty
20 6
to take reasonable steps to rescue Person B.
The proposed Restatement Third does not challenge the
continuing vitality of such rules; indeed, Chapter 7 expressly endorses
commonly-recognized affirmative duties. 20 7 However, by elevating to
black letter status the general duty to avoid creating a risk, the
proposed Restatement narrows the applicability of affirmative duties,
capturing a greater number of cases under the broad mandate of
Section 7(a). It does so by drawing a clear line separating cases
involving misfeasance, in which the general duty applies, from those
involving nonfeasance, which require the imposition of an affirmative
duty.
Take, for example, the case of Harper v. Herman.20
The
plaintiff, Mr. Harper, was one of several guests aboard the sailboat of
the defendant, Mr. Herman. After some period of time sailing, the
group collectively expressed a desire to swim. At the defendant's
suggestion, they sailed to a popular swimming area where the water
remained shallow for a substantial distance from shore.
The
defendant laid anchor at a place "shallow enough for his guests to use
the boat ladder to enter the water, but still deep enough so they could
swim." 20 9 While the defendant was lowering the ladder, the plaintiff
asked the defendant if he was "going in."210 When the defendant
responded in the affirmative, the plaintiff dove without warning into
what turned out to be shallow water, severing his spinal cord.

204. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 19, § 314; DOBBS, supra note 11, § 314, at 853. The
proposed Restatement Third also endorses this general rule. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 4, supra note
5, §§ 37. ("Subject to §§ 39-45, an actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical harm to
another has no duty of care to the other.").
205. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 314, at 854 (describing duty to rescue generally).
206. See id. (describing duty arising from non-negligent creation of a continuing risk).
207. TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 4, supra note 5, §§ 39-45.
208. 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993).
209. Harper,499 N.W.2d at 473.
210. Id. at 474.
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The court determined that these facts gave rise to a claim of
nonfeasance. Thus the issue considered by the court was whether the
defendant, as a social host and experienced boater, owed the plaintiff
an affirmative duty to warn him that the water was too shallow for
diving. 2 11 After considering the relative power and expectations of the
parties, the court ultimately concluded that the facts did not support a
"special relationship" between the parties sufficient to give rise to an
affirmative duty to warn.
Consider how the court might have decided Harper under the
proposed Restatement.
Although Section 41 of the proposed
Restatement recognizes the possibility that an affirmative duty may
arise from a special relationship, 212 the court need not have resorted to
an affirmative duty analysis. By taking the plaintiff for a sail,
suggesting a place for the group to swim, positioning the boat in
shallow water, and subsequently affirming his personal intention to
swim, the defendant created a risk of harm. The defendant's conduct
was doubtless a factual cause of the plaintiffs injury. Thus, pursuant
to the Section 7(a) general duty standard-and without regard to the
Section 41 affirmative duty standard-the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty of reasonable care. Under the proposed Restatement,
the Harper case is not a nonfeasance case at all, but one of
misfeasance.
The potential effect of Section 7(a) on cases like Harper v.
Herman is not lost on the proposed Restatement. Comment b to
Section 41, entitled "Connection to ordinary duty of reasonable care
based on creating risk of harm," addresses the matter directly:
In some cases the duty imposed by this section is a pure affirmative duty because the
actor had no role in creating the risk of harm to the other ....
In other cases, the
actor's conduct might have played a role in creating the risk to the injured party ....
In
these cases, the source of the duty of reasonable care is § 7.213

Section 7(a)'s effect on affirmative duties does not, however,
end at the particularized application of affirmative duties to facts such
as those of Harper v. Herman. More broadly, Section 7(a) might
require a conclusion that certain affirmative duties are not properly
characterized as affirmative duties at all, but rather constitute reaffirmations-in light of facts to which the no-duty-to-rescue rule

211. Id.

212. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 41.
213. Id. at § 41, cmt. b. In defending against the idea that Section 41 is therefore
superfluous, the Reporters note that deciding such cases under Section 7 is sometimes
problematic because it would call for "an inquiry into what would have happened if the actor's
conduct ... had never occurred." Id. Section 41 essentially acts as a back-up source of duty in
such cases,
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might appear applicable---of the Section 7 duty not unreasonably to
create a risk. Section 40 of the proposed Restatement, for instance,
recognizes the near-universal rule that where a defendant nonnegligently creates a continuing risk, the defendant owes a duty
reasonably to protect or warn others of the risk and to rescue them
from any resulting harm. 214 To use a much-cited example-where a
train non-negligently severs the limb of a person who darted onto the
tracks just as the train was passing, the train's operators owe a duty
to render assistance to the injured person. 215 In light of Section 7(a),
such a case might not present an affirmative duty scenario at all.
Because the train operators created a risk of injuring someone by
barreling down the tracks, they owed a duty of reasonable care
pursuant to Section 7(a)-a duty that might require calling an
ambulance in the event that the train causes someone harm. In this
sense, the duty to call the ambulance would not be an affirmative
duty-an exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule-but a part of the
216
duty to act reasonably when one's conduct creates a risk.

214. Id. at § 40; see also DOBBS, supra note 11, § 316, at 856-57 (offering an account of this
affirmative duty).
215. Maldonado v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 629 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); see
also TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 40, cmt. c, ill.3 (citing an analogous hypothetical in
which a person non-negligently jumps off a bridge, landing on a person who, after the jumper
jumped, had swum from underneath the bridge).
216. The Restatement expressly recognizes this possibility in Comment c to § 40. See
TENTATIVE DRAFr NO. 4, supra note 5, § 40, cmt. c:
This section imposes a duty that might be subsumed under the general duty of
reasonable care in § 7 ... When an actor engages in a course of conduct that continues
throughout the time the other person is at risk, the rule stated in this section might
be applicable, but a court is more likely to apply the general principle in § 7.
Section 40 reads: "When an actor's prior conduct, even though not tortious, creates a continuing
risk of physical harm of a type characteristic of the conduct, the actor has a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent or minimize the harm." Section 40 might best be understood not as
an affirmative duty, but as a limitation on the Section 7 general duty standard. Although,
pursuant to Section 7, one owes a duty of reasonable care when one creates a risk, Section 40
limits that duty by imposing it only where the actor's earlier conduct creates a risk "of a type
characteristic of the conduct." With this phrase, the proposed Restatement imposes a proximatecause-like limitation on the application of Section 7 to "continuing risk" scenarios, as a means of
distinguishing cases in which the defendant's conduct played only a very minor role in causing
the plaintiffs harm. For example, where a bus driver drops a passenger in a ski resort town,
then later sees the person unknowingly ski into a hazardous area of the mountain, Section 7
might suggest that the bus driver owes a duty reasonably to warn the person. The language of
Section 40 provides a mechanism to limit or negate such a duty.
In this author's opinion, the premise for Section 40 is flawed. A better understanding of
Section 7 is that it creates a duty of reasonable care only with regard to the conduct that creates a
risk. Understood thus, Section 7 would only impose upon the train operators a duty to operate
the train reasonably or upon the bus driver a duty to drive and drop off passengers carefully. It
would not impose a duty to rescue someone harmed as a result of the train operator's or bus
driver's non-negligent conduct. A subsequent duty to rescue must arise independently, as an
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In either way that the proposed Restatement transforms
affirmative-duty cases into cases in which the general duty standard
applies, the Restatement affects the role of foreseeability. Many
courts' affirmative duty analyses rely on foreseeability of harm, risk,
or plaintiff in much the same way as do their conventional duty
analyses. 2 17 By capturing in the fold of Section 7(a) cases typically
requiring an analysis of affirmative duty, the proposed Restatement
renders foreseeability irrelevant to the existence of a duty in such
cases. The high court of Pennsylvania's decision in R. W. v. Manzek 2 18
is illustrative. In Manzek, parents sued their daughter's school in
negligence after their child was sexually assaulted while selling candy
door-to-door for a school fundraiser. 219 The primary issue before the
court was whether the school owed an affirmative duty reasonably to
protect its fundraising students from the risk of assault. 220 Resolution
of this question, according to the court, depended on whether a
"special relationship" existed between the school and the plaintiff, and
on whether "the harm that befell [the plaintiff] while participating in
the fundraiser, fell within a foreseeable, general, broad class of
risks."22 1 The court ultimately upheld the lower court's decision that
sexual assault was not a foreseeable danger of selling candy door-todoor, and therefore that the defendant owed no affirmative duty to
222
guard the plaintiff against such danger.
Had the proposed Restatement Third applied, the court likely
would not have deemed Manzek to be an affirmative-duty case at all.
By initiating the fundraising activity, the school created a risk that
students would be assaulted and was a factual cause of the plaintiffs
injury. Thus, pursuant to Section 7(a), the school owed a duty of care
without regard to any "special relationship" between the school and its
students and, more importantly, without regard to the foreseeability
of sexual assault. Of course, the court would be free to decide as a
exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule, a true affirmative duty. The author plans to make this
issue the subject of a subsequent scholarly work.
217. See, e.g., Beach v. Jean, 746 A.2d 228, 234 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) ("In any
determination of whether a special relationship should give rise to a duty to exercise care to
avoid harm to a third person, the key element is foreseeability."); R.W.v. Manzek, 838 A.2d 801,
806-08 (Pa. 2003) (considering, at least in part by reference to foreseeability, whether a school
owed affirmative duty to protect a student from harm suffered while selling candy for a school
fundraiser).
218. 838 A.2d 801 (Pa. 2003).
219. Manzek, 838 A.2d at 803.
220. Actually, in light of the procedural context of the case, the issue was whether the state
trial court properly relied on the foreseeability reasoning of the federal district court in which the
case was first tried. Id. at 803-04.
221. Id. at 806.
222. Id. at 807.
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matter of law that the school acted reasonably under the
circumstances or, if the court decides that the intervening sexual
assault was unforeseeable as a matter of law, that the school's
unreasonableness was not a proximate cause of the child's injury.
Duty,
however,
would
remain
unencumbered
by
such
considerations. 223
The effect of Section 7(a) on Manzek reflects generally how the
proposed Restatement will limit foreseeability's place in the analysis
of many affirmative-duty cases. If courts take Section 7(a) seriously,
no longer will foreseeability operate as a limiting factor in such cases.
That is, in light of Section 7(a), courts in affirmative-duty cases will no
longer cite a lack of foreseeability as a reason for refusing to impose a
duty. Section 7(a) might not, however, purge foreseeability completely
from the affirmative-duty landscape. Foreseeability may yet retain a
foothold in two scenarios.
First, courts might decline to impose a duty for lack of
foreseeability where a defendant's conduct did not create a risk of
harm, but where a duty might otherwise exist pursuant to one of the
traditional exceptions to the rescue rule. 224 The proposed Restatement
anticipates this phenomenon and discourages it for the same reasons
that foreseeability should not serve to limit duty where the defendant
225
created a risk.
Foreseeability's second possible remaining function in
affirmative-duty cases is exemplified by the Tarasoff case, discussed
above. 226 In Tarasoff, the court imposed on a psychologist a duty to
warn third parties of a risk of physical harm posed by the
psychologist's patient. 227 The court imposed this duty in part because
of the special relationship between the psychologist and his patient,
but also because psychologists as a profession are especially privy to
the violent intentions of their patients. 228 Although the proposed
Restatement discourages the use of unforeseeability (class-based or
otherwise) as a reason to decline to impose a duty, it does not
explicitly preclude courts' consideration of a particular ability to
223. Of course, were the Manzek court troubled by the policy implications of the school's
potential liability, the court might refuse to impose a duty due to a Section 7(b) "special problem
of policy or principle."
224. See, e.g., Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Corner, 943 P.2d 286, 291-93 (Wash. 1997) (recognizing
special relationship between the defendant convenience store and its patron, the plaintiff, but
declining to impose an affirmative duty to provide security personnel due to a lack of sufficient
foreseeability of injury).
225. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 38, cmt. c.
226. See supranotes 99-102 and accompanying text.
227. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
228. Id. at 343-45.
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foresee injury as a reason to impose an affirmative duty. The
proposed Restatement simply does not address the question.
Nonetheless, as a normative matter such use of foreseeability would
seem to be inconsistent with the general push of the proposed
Restatement against foreseeability's use in duty determinations. If a
particular inability to foresee injury may not serve as a reason to
decline to impose a duty, then a particular ability to foresee injury
would seem to be similarly irrelevant in deciding to impose a duty. 229
E. Transparencyin Decisions of Public Policy
As explained above, courts sometimes ostensibly decide the
issue of duty on grounds of foreseeability, when in fact their decisions
rest on considerations of public policy. 230 With Section 7, the proposed
Restatement Third sharply curtails this practice, pressing judges to be
forthright with their public policy choices. Section 7 impels this
change in two steps. First, as has been demonstrated above, Section
7(a) renders foreseeability irrelevant to courts' duty analysis in most
cases. Because a duty inheres whenever a defendant's conduct creates
a risk of harm, any consideration of foreseeability is expelled from the
duty calculus into breach and proximate cause. By taking away the
primary screen behind which courts obscure decisions of policy,
Section 7(a) leaves courts with little option but to make transparent
the policy choices that underlie certain duty questions. Second,
Section 7(b) provides that courts may decline to impose a duty
otherwise called-for under Section 7(a) due to "special problems of
principle or policy that warrant denying liability." 231 Section 7(b) thus
expressly encourages courts to make policy-based exceptions to duty,
at least in the "exceptional" case in which a court deems such an
232
exception necessary.

229. Still, one might argue that these two uses of foreseeability are not necessarily two sides
of the same coin. Suppose that the Tarasoff court had held that a psychologist owes no duty
because it is generally not foreseeable that a psychologist's patient may pose a risk to a third
party. In such case, a psychologist would escape liability even where a jury might find that the
harm was indeed foreseeable--or even, as was the case in Tarasoff, actually foreseen-by the
defendant psychologist. Such a result would be nonsensical. The Tarasoff court's use of classbased foreseeability as a reason to impose an affirmative duty avoids this problem. Although the
court imposed a duty based in part on psychologists' unique ability to foresee harm to third
persons, the jury remained free to deny liability in the context of breach or proximate cause
because the risk, the type or manner of injury, or the plaintiff was not foreseeable under the
circumstances.
230. See supra notes 121-140 and accompanying text.
231. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 7(b).
232. See id.
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The discussion of Graff v. Beard in Part III.B above illustrates
how subsections 7(a) and (b) will work together to change courts'
approach to cases in which the duty determination implicates
compelling policy considerations. 2 33 Graff involved a claim by the
victim of a drunk driver against the social host who had served the
driver alcohol. 234 The Graff court declined to impose a duty at least in
part because the risk of guests becoming intoxicated, driving drunk,
and injuring a third person was not sufficiently foreseeable to require
a duty to guard against such risk.235 Had the court applied Section
7(a), it would have concluded that the host owed a duty of reasonable
care-in serving alcohol to guests, the host created a risk of harm and
in fact caused the harm to the plaintiff.
Still, consistent with Section 7(a), the court might rely upon
foreseeability to hold that the host did not breach his duty as a matter
of law. Such a decision seems unlikely, however, in light of the fact
that the defendant served alcohol to an already-intoxicated guest
whom the defendant knew would subsequently drive home.
Reasonable jurors surely could find that such conduct created a
foreseeable risk, and was therefore unreasonable and a breach of the
host's duty.
In the alternative, the court might conclude as a matter of law
that the driver's negligence in driving drunk superseded the
wrongdoing of the social host, thereby precluding proximate causation.
The viability of such a decision would depend primarily on the
jurisdiction's rules for proximate cause. In some jurisdictions, for
example, only an intervening grossly negligent, reckless, or
intentional act supersedes a defendant's negligence. 236 Certainly,
were the court to apply the proposed Restatement's "scope of liability"
provision, the court would find it difficult to hold as a matter of law
that the defendant's conduct was not the proximate cause of the
7
plaintiffs injuries. 23
The real problem with both of these resolutions, howeverdecisions denying breach or proximate cause as a matter of law-is
that neither addresses the Graff court's evident desire to implement a

233. See supra notes 178-183 and accompanying text.
234. Graffv. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 918 (Tex. 1993).
235. Id. at 920-21.
236. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 181 N.E.2d 430, 435 (N.Y. 1962)
(holding that only gross intervening negligence or worse may sever proximate causation).
237. Section 29 of TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3, supra note 30, provides that "[a]n actor is not
liable for harm different from the harms whose risks made the actor's conduct tortious." Because
a car crash is a harm whose risk made the host's provision of alcohol to driving guests
unreasonable, the plaintiffs claim would likely satisfy proximate cause under this test.
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broad ban on social host liability. This desire no doubt prompted the
court to dismiss the case under the rubric of duty, which is
traditionally amenable to broad, categorical rules. 238 For this same
reason, were the Graff court to apply the proposed Restatement, the
court would likely ground its dismissal of the case in Section 7(b).
Like foreseeability, Section 7(b) provides a means by which the court
might decline to impose a duty in a category of cases and thereby
create a broad rule against social host liability. The "catch" is that the
court must do so by explicit reference to the "special problem of
principle or policy" that underlies its desire to create a broad rule-in
the case of social host liability, the court's desire to protect the great
American keg party (and, of course, other social gatherings at which
239
alcohol is served).
Courts faced with dilemmas similar to that in Graff v. Beard
will thus be guided by the carrot of Section 7(b) and the stick of
Section 7(a) to write opinions that transparently explain duty
decisions in terms of public policy. One might contend, however, that
Section 7 leaves a back door through which courts might re-infuse
duty with foreseeability. A lack of foreseeability certainly might
constitute a "special problem of principle or policy" pursuant to
Section 7(b). Some courts, for instance, already consider the difficulty
a social host has in foreseeing guests' conduct to be a policy reason to
limit a host's liability. 240
Moreover, courts might even cite the
proposed Restatement itself in support of such a proposition. Section
38 of the proposed Restatement imports the exception found in Section
7(b) into the realm of affirmative duties-pursuant to Section 38, a
court may decline to impose an otherwise-applicable affirmative duty
by reference to "special problems of principle or policy. '24 1 Comment c
to Section 38-entitled "The role of foreseeability in affirmative duties
and the allocationof judge and jury roles"-explains that courts "more
carefully supervise [affirmative duty] cases than cases in which the
actor's own conduct created a risk of harm," and that courts frequently
do so through the use of foreseeability. 242 The placement of this
comment as a modifier to Section 7(b)'s affirmative-duty analog
arguably implies the proposed Restatement's endorsement of

238. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Kovar v. Krampitz, 941 S.W.2d 249, 254-55 (Tex. App. 1996) (explaining that
the difficulty a social host has in controlling guests and knowing the quantity of their alcohol
intake counsels against imposing a common law duty upon hosts who serve alcohol).
241. TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 4, supra note 5, § 38.

242. Id. § 38 cmt. c.
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foreseeability as a "special problem of principle or policy" by which a
court might decline to impose a duty.
Although a court desperately enamored with foreseeability
might indeed argue as much, such is not the proposed Restatement's
intent. Insofar as courts currently refer to foreseeability as a policy
reason not to impose liability, this Article has shown that what courts
are really doing is to decide reasonableness or proximate cause
without proper deference to the jury and its role. The proposed
Restatement is quite clear that if the defendant caused the plaintiffs
injury or even created a risk of injury, the defendant owed a duty of
reasonable care. Furthermore, Section 7(b) provides that deviations
from this rule are to be "exceptional" and only due to "special"
problems of principle or policy.
Lack of foreseeability is not
"exceptional" or "special," but rather a run-of-the-mill argument made
by defendants in many negligence cases. As for Comment c to Section
38, it is notable that no similar comment modifies Section 7.
Moreover, Comment c taken as a whole in fact discourages courts' use
of foreseeability as a means of limiting affirmative duties. 243 For all of
these reasons, it seems clear that it is not the proposed Restatement's
intent that foreseeability limit duty as a "special problem of principle
or policy" under Section 7(b).
IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED RESTATEMENT

A. A Boon for the Rule of Law
Central to our system of jurisprudence, and indeed to American
society in general, is our dedication to the "rule of law." The rule of
law represents our resistance to anarchy, arbitrariness, and prejudice
and our related attempts to render legitimate the exercise of judicial
power. 244
It encompasses the following interrelated goals: (1)
neutrality-that cases should be decided by laws, not by judicial
243. See id.
Courts have other devices [than duty] to limit liability when they are persuaded that
the defendants should not be liable.... Invoking no duty in these situations is more
comfortable for courts because duty remains a question for the court.
Yet
determinations of no breach as a matter of law more accurately reflect that the court
is pretermitting jury consideration of an element of the case traditionally left to the
jury.
244. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, Legal Culture and The Practice: A Postmodern Depiction of the
Rule of Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001) ("[Ihe rule of law's historic purpose: 'to protect
against anarchy and establish a scheme of public order, . . . and to protect against at least some
types of official arbitrariness.' ") (citation omitted).
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preference; 245 (2) consistency in law's interpretation and applicationthat like cases should be decided alike and different cases
differently; 24 6 (3) generality-that laws should be applied generally,
without regard to the qualities of a particular person or group of
persons; 247 (4) transparency-that laws and the reasoning of judges
should be susceptible to public scrutiny; 248 (5) predictability-that
laws should be fixed in advance and may serve as guides for public
behavior; 249 and (6) procedural fairness-that all persons subject to
criminal or civil action should have the opportunity fairly to be
250
heard.
Despite the attractiveness of these goals, scholars at least since
the legal realist movement have taught us that a system governed

245. See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration:Protecting Fundamental Values
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1594 (2001)
("Central to the rule of law is the notion that judicial decision making must be marked by reason,
integrity, and consistency."); Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great
Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 482 (2004) ("[How do we prevent
courts, in the guise of enforcing their interpretation of the law, from usurping the rightful
functions of the elected branches of government? That is, how do we prevent the rule of law from
becoming the rule of the judges?"); Neil S. Siegel, State Sovereign Immunity and Stare Decisis:
Solving the Prisoners' Dilemma Within the Court, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1165, 1183 (2001)
("[R]eplicability, stability, and consistency in application are values that the ideal of the rule of
law is intended to serve."); Thomas, supra note 244, at 1497 ("Although the rule of law does not
have a precise, well-accepted definition, it is generally contrasted with the 'rule of man.' ").
246. See Merrill, supra note 245, at 519 ("Sometimes the rule of law is taken to mean
consistency in the interpretation of law. Sometimes it is taken to mean fidelity to the opinions of
the Supreme Court."); W. Bradley Wendel, "Certain Fundamental Truths" A Dialectic on
Negative and Positive Liberty in Hate Speech Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 55 (2002)
("Of course generality and consistency are what the rule of law is all about. Judges must treat
like cases alike.").
247. See Wendel, supra note 246, at 55 (stating that the rule of law "is what prevents the
state from arbitrarily granting favors to some and punishments to others on the basis of rules
that do not apply generally").
248. See William Mock, On the Centrality of Information Law: A Rational Choice Discussion
of Information Law and Transparency, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1069, 1099
(1999) ("[T]he Rule of Law is impossible without transparency and the accountability it makes
possible.").
249. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1997) (noting the formalist ideal of the rule of law that law be
consistent, clear, and determined in advance); Thomas, supra note 244, at 1498 (noting that one
of the rule of law's purpose is "to allow people to plan their affairs with advance knowledge of the
legal consequences"); id.:
Rule of law generally requires rules that are fixed in advance, that are publicly
known, and that are applied with a degree of neutrality to both the governor and the
governed.
Modern accounts of the rule of law generally identify five basic
characteristics of rule of law: (1) capacity of legal rules to guide people's conduct, (2)
efficacy in doing so, (3) stability of the rules, (4) supremacy of law over governmental
actors, and (5) an instrumentality of impartial justice.
250. See Fallon, supra note 249, at 16-18 (noting the legal process theorist's view of the rule
of law ensuring procedural fairness and that courts reach decisions by reasoned elaboration).
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absolutely by the rule of law is flawed, impossible, or both, and
25 1
tolerates little intrusion from the world of real facts and real people.
Thus, judges' relationship with the rule of law is schizophrenic. While
one hemisphere of the judicial brain embraces the rule of law, the
other hemisphere longs for, or at least cannot escape, the exercise of
legislative-like discretion-the freedom to seek out the "right" result
252
in a particular case without regard to the rule of law.
The struggle between these two forces in judicial
decisionmaking is especially pronounced in tort cases, which are
particularly fact-driven and often implicate extra-evidentiary policy
considerations. It is perhaps this tension that has led courts in
negligence cases to rely upon foreseeability when ruling on the
existence of a duty. Foreseeability sounds "doctrinal," if only because
it has been part of the duty calculus for so long. Furthermore, because
foreseeability is so inherently flexible, when used to determine duty it
affords courts broad discretionary power. One can see why this
combination of qualities might be attractive to a judge. Yet it is
exactly this combination that makes foreseeability's persistent
appearance in duty analyses so insidious to the rule of law.
It is perhaps foreseeability's malleability that is most harmful
to the rule of law in negligence cases. As explained in Part II above,
courts utilize foreseeability to decide duty in at least five different
ways, 253 although commonly without recognizing the conceptual
differences between them. The result is a body of law that is at best
inconsistent
and
unreliable,
and
at
worst
downright
incomprehensible. Because the use of foreseeability in duty analyses
is so opaque, it opens the way for like cases to be treated differently
and different cases to be treated alike. In addition, because duty rules
are created by the court, they are meant to serve as broadly-applicable
guidelines for public behavior. Foreseeability determinations are
inherently fact-specific, however, and are thus not broadly-applicable
and are incapable of serving as useful behavioral guides. As Prosser

251. See generally Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) (suggesting that in adhering to the rule of law, courts ignore entirely
the reality of human affairs); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930) (setting forth classic basis for "rule-skepticism"); Margaret Jane
Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989) (proposing that although the
ideal of the rule of law is impossible, a reconceived notion is worth keeping around).
252. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 56-70
(2d ed. 1951) (arguing that judges decide cases based on their intuition, then subsequently create
law to justify the result).
253. Foreseeability of risk, type or manner of harm, and plaintiff, and the decision of public
policy by reference to foreseeability.
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noted, "[f]oreseeability ... carries only an illusion of certainty in
254
defining the consequences for which the defendant will be liable."
Foreseeability's indeterminacy creates an even deeper
challenge to the rule of law, however. The more flexible, nebulous, or
undefined a legal concept, the more likely it is to be used as a front, a
screen for the real reasons that a court reaches its decision. To the
extent that foreseeability serves as cover for judicial discretion, it
enshrouds the decisionmaking process and creates an impression of
arbitrariness. This lack of transparency is anathema to the rule of
law, even if one has faith that judges exercise discretion in good faith.
And what if foreseeability hides irrational or even prejudicial reasons
for deciding tort liability? Because the power of foreseeability, when
used in the context of duty, is so broad and so erratically defined, such
injustices may go unnoticed and unchecked.
Foreseeability's prominence in duty decisions poses yet another
threat to the rule of law. Each aspect of foreseeability's use in the
context of duty overlaps with either an analysis of breach or proximate
cause. 255 Such redundancy is confusing and illogical and frustrates
the longstanding allocation of decisionmaking power between judge
and jury. 256 Foreseeability's redundant roles also give rise to the
possibility that judge and jury might reach inconsistent conclusions
with regard to whether a risk, type or manner of injury, or plaintiff
was foreseeable. For example, suppose that a defendant moves for
summary judgment on grounds that it owed no duty because the
plaintiff was not foreseeable. Suppose also that the judge rejects this
argument and imposes a duty on the defendant, at least by
implication holding that the plaintiff was indeed foreseeable. Should
the case go to trial, the jury is yet free to find that the plaintiffs case
fails proximate cause because it was unforeseeable that defendant's
breach would harm the particular plaintiff. 257 In such a case, both
judge and jury have considered the issue of plaintiff-foreseeability and
have reached opposing conclusions. Such inconsistency undermines

254. Prosser, supra note 61, at 19; see id. at 17-19 (citing many examples of the
unpredictability of foreseeability determinations by courts).
255. See supra notes 81-120 and accompanying text and Part III.B & C.
256. See infra notes 258-310 and accompanying text; see also Leon Green, Jury Trial and
Proximate Cause, 35 TEX. L. REV. 357, 358 (1957) ("When [legal] doctrines lack precision and
rationality they blur the functions of court and jury. In the confusion that results anything can
happen, and one of the things that does happen is a taking over of more and more power by the
judges themselves.").
257. A judge could of course, skirt this particular problem by instructing the jury that the
plaintiff was foreseeable as a matter of law. To this author's knowledge, however, such
instructions are not common. This is likely the case because such decisions are properly reserved
for the jury in the first place!
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the rule of law both in terms of procedural fairness and predictability
and in terms of the goal of treating like cases alike.
Courts' widespread adoption of Section 7 of the proposed
Restatement will check these erosions of the rule of law by purging
duty of considerations of foreseeability. By herding considerations of
foreseeability into their conceptually proper pens-breach and
proximate cause-no longer will duty analysis prove redundant. By
imposing a duty whenever a defendant has created a risk of harm, the
standard for duty could not be more simple, clear, and predictable. By
instructing judges that a refusal to impose a duty despite the
defendant's creation of a risk must turn on an exceptional problem of
policy or principle, Section 7 encourages judges to be transparent in
their reasons for declining to impose a duty, rather than to rely on the
screen of foreseeability. Finally, as discussed below, by sending factdriven determinations of foreseeability to the jury, Section 7 realigns
the age-old allocation of power between jury and judge.
B. A Shift in Power from Judge to Jury
Notwithstanding its benefits for the rule of law, the most
significant effect of the proposed Restatement's conceptual
restructuring is that by casting foreseeability out of duty,
foreseeability as a limitation on negligence liability is no longer a
presumed matter for the judge, but a presumed matter for the jury.
This raises the question of whether such a shift is desirable. Debate
over the allocation of power between judge and jury in negligence
cases generally is as intense as it is long in the tooth.' Several aspects
of this debate are worth mentioning here, however, as they place the
Restatement's dramatic effect on foreseeability into broader context.
As detailed above, foreseeability most logically informs the
inquiries of breach and proximate cause. 258 Because it is settled law
that breach and proximate cause are matters to be decided by the
jury, 259 one might conclude that foreseeability also is properly a jury
question. Nonetheless, judges consistently rule on foreseeability in
the context of duty without deference to the jury. In an attempt to
make an explicit case for the Restatement's largely implicit assault on
foreseeability as a judicial determination, this Article now turns to a
discussion first, of the jury's historical primacy in deciding breach and
proximate cause; second, of why judges may have moved away from
this practice, particularly by reliance upon foreseeability; and third, of

258. See supra notes 17-54 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 17-51.
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why as a normative matter foreseeability should be left, in the first
instance, to the jury.
In seventeenth and eighteenth century English and colonial
American courts, the jury was held in such esteem that it was often
said to be the judge of both fact and law. 260 The jury's privileged
position among American colonists likely stemmed from a common
post-Enlightenment view that man is inherently reasonable and that
even the most ordinary man is capable of discerning natural law and
reaching the "right" resolution of a legal dispute. 26 1 According to this
populist notion, ordinary men were not only capable but were the best
possible decisionmakers for most disputes. The concentration of
power in single men (i.e., judges) was suspect, 26 2 and the belief was
widespread that judges were either corrupt 263 or biased in favor of
wealthy private or government litigants. 264 Juries thus represented a
powerful democratic force, providing a check on the power of the
judiciary. 265 Indeed, the Framers' early faith in the jury was so
powerful that the right to civil jury trial was constitutionally
266
guaranteed, at least in federal courts, by the Seventh Amendment.
In the torts arena particularly, the jury's predominance began
even earlier, perhaps as early as the fifteenth century. Professor
Patrick Kelley cites the work of English law historians S.F.C. Milsom
and M.J. Pritchard in offering a revealing explanation of the jury's
267
importance to the development of negligence law:
260. Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the
Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 350 (1995); see also JAMES P. LEVINE, JURIES AND POLITICS
24 (1992) (noting that juries had "power not only to decide the facts but to interpret the law and
to apply their own moral standards").
261. Dooley, supra note 260, at 350-51; Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the
Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L. J. 170, 172 (1964) [hereinafter The Changing Role] ("Since
natural law was thought to be accessible to the ordinary man, the theory invited each juror to
inquire for himself whether a particular rule of law was consonant with principles of higher
law.").
262. Dooley, supra note 260, at 350-51.
263. See Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, JudicialAssessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh
Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 153-54 (1991) (arguing that
eighteenth-century view of juries was of an important political body and a check on potentially
corrupt judges); The ChangingRole, supra note 261, at 173 (same).
264. Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 639, 679-84 (1973); see also Scheiner, supra note 263, at 144 ("For the Antifederalists, the
civil jury would play a dual role in the new Republic; it would protect the common people against
the judges' biases in favor of the government and the private ruling class, and also establish a
small preserve of direct self-government in the face of the remote Federal regime.").
265. Dooley, supra note 260, at 350; Scheiner, supra note 263, at 153-54.
266. See Dooley, supra note 260, at 351-52 (describing forces that led to passage of the
Seventh Amendment).
267. See generally Kelley, supra note 2 (citing S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE COMMON LAW (2d ed. 1981); M.J. PRITCHARD, SCOTT V. SHEPHERD (1773) AND THE

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:3:739

The formal "law" of trespass and trespass on the case, the old forms of action we see as
forerunners of the modern common law of torts, was really law about what had to be
pleaded to get past the courts at Westminster and get out to a virtually unreviewable
trial before a jury in the county. Pleadings in trespass were ritualized: the plaintiff
ordinarily began with a stylized formula that touched only briefly the real facts in the
case. The defendant's ordinary response was to plead the general issue, which denied
generally the facts pleaded and also, according to Milsom, denied that defendant had
acted wrongfully.
Pleading the general issue sent the case to the jury, which
determined the8 facts and also decided whether, on those facts, defendant had wronged
26
the plaintiff.

At some point in the eighteenth century, however, the English
courts initiated procedural rules that allowed courts to review juryfound facts and to rule as a matter of law on the wrongfulness of the
defendant's conduct. 269 This development put the jury's primacy at
risk and threatened to "reduce the law of torts to a multitudinous set
of very specific legal rules of conduct. ' 270 According to Kelley, Milsom,
and Pritchard, it was in response to this threat that the English courts
developed the general duty of care pleading and the ordinary
reasonable man standard. 2 71 Each of these developments tied the
wrongfulness determination generally to accepted customs and
practices of the community and protected the jury's position as the
272
most able body to determine them.
On the heels of these developments, the modern doctrine of
proximate cause emerged in the 1840s and 1850s. 273 Unlike the
general duty of care pleading and the reasonable man standard,
proximate cause served as a limitation on liability, 274 a reminder that

EMERGENCE OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE (1976)); Kelley, Proximate Cause, supra note 52
(same).
268. Kelley, supra note 52, at 57.
269. Id. at 62.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 62-63.
272. Id. at 87; Kelley, supra note 2, at 1057-59. According to Kelley:
The formal legal statement of the standard as the conduct of the ordinary reasonable
man was pitched at a high level of generality .... [This] could effectively keep the
judges from reviewing jury verdicts on the facts developed at trial, for the judges did
not need to decide as a matter of law whether certain conduct was negligent. All they
needed to decide was whether the jury could reasonably find that the conduct was not
that of the ordinary reasonable man.
Kelley, supra note 52, at 62; id. at 64: Similarly, the general duty of care pleading
avoided the multiple categories that would have developed if customs of the realm had
to be pleaded specifically under the new procedural conditions that encouraged
accurate fact pleading. [Thus] . . ., the courts avoided... [the] risk of transferring
from the jury to the courts the responsibility for determining the standard of behavior.
273. Kelley, supra note 52, at 89.
274. See Green, supra note 256, at 358 ("[Proximate cause] was taken over by the commonlaw courts from insurance law in the early 1800's and incorporated into the development of the
action for negligence as a retreat from the strict liability of medieval common law.").
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even in the event that a defendant acted wrongfully, not all
repercussions of such wrongfulness warrant liability. Like the issue of
wrongfulness, however, proximate cause also was left to the jury.
Explanations for this historical phenomenon are elusive, and the
strong policy undercurrents of proximate cause determinations have
led some to question the wisdom of the practice. 275 Indeed, a few legal
scholars have even suggested that proximate cause is only ostensibly a
matter for the jury, and that courts typically decide (and have since its
inception decided) proximate cause as a matter of law. 276 Such a claim
is likely overstated, however, 277 and the jury has retained firstinstance authority over proximate cause against a number of
278
encroachments over the years.
Despite centuries of jury primacy in tort law, beginning as
early as the eighteenth century 279 and gaining momentum in the
nineteenth, the jury fell into disfavor. 28 0 Scholars have proffered a
number of theories to explain this fall. One common explanation is
that the industrial revolution spurred judicial concern that tort jury
verdicts might thwart corporate and industrial progress. 28 1 Another
275. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence: Some Ramblings
Inspired by Robertson, 57 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (1997) (evaluating the merits of jury decision of
proximate cause); Kelley, supra note 52, at 88-89 (arguing that proximate cause is more
appropriately decided by the judge); E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty.Risk v. Proximate
Cause and the RationalAllocation of Function Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 1, 26
(1977) (explaining that under the duty-risk schema, championed by Leon Green, the judge
determines the policy questions posed by the proximate cause inquiry).
276. Galligan, supra note 1, at 1511; Kelley, supra note 52, at 88.
277. None of the foregoing distinguished scholars cite quantitative evidence of the
phenomenon-nor is this author aware of any. Professor Kelley suggests that the fact that
judges more frequently decide proximate cause as a matter of law than breach may be because
"the purpose questions underlying proximate cause issues are ordinarily easy questions on which
reasonable people would all agree." Kelley, supra note 52, at 88-89. Although this is an
intriguing argument, this author remains unconvinced. Proximate cause questions seem to be
just as Gordian as those of breach, oftentimes much more so.
278. See, e.g., Daniel J. Steinbock et al., Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 261, 267 (1988) ("Prior to abolition of the rule excluding testimony as to ultimate issues,
expert opinion on the issue of proximate cause would have been excluded as a matter of course.
The rule ... excluded lay or expert opinion upon an ultimate issue on the ground that such an
opinion 'invaded the province of the jury' or 'usurped the function of the jury.' "). Of course, the
most successful threat to the jury has been the use of foreseeability in the context of duty.
279. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 87 (detailing the eighteenth-century shift in power between judge and jury).
280. See generally David Millon, Juries, Judges, and Democracy, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135
(1993)

(reviewing SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-

AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1990) (describing the nineteenth-century
demise of juridical authority)); The ChangingRole, supra note 261 (noting the same).
281. Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an UnappreciatedHistory,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 605-07 (1993) (citing MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW:
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cites the fact that turn-of-the-century formalists, led by Dean Langdell
of Harvard, ushered in the notion that the study of law should be
approached as a science, and that law itself consists of a closed system
of uniform, predictable rules. 28 2 According to this theory, because such
rules stem from the decisions of judges, not juries, the formalist
movement influenced judges to co-opt jury questions for judicial
resolution. 28 3 Other scholars have attributed the jury's decline to the
increasing sophistication and training of the judiciary and the fading
28 4
need for the jury to serve as a weapon against English imperialism.
Still others point to the possibility that professional elitism or classism
on the part of lawyers and judges 28 5 or the inclusion of women and
minorities in the jury pool may have sparked scorn and distrust
toward the jury system. 28 6 Whatever the reason, most seem to agree
that courts continued to erode the power of the jury in negligence
28 7
actions throughout the twentieth century.
It is perhaps as part of this larger story of the jury's fall from
grace that judges have seized upon foreseeability as an instrument by
which to strip decisionmaking power from the jury. There are,
however, particular, functional reasons that judges may wish to decide
foreseeability. For example, the judge, unlike any jury, typically has
vast experience in considering such matters and might bring this

THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975); Wes S. Malone,
The Formative Era of ContributoryNegligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151 (1946)); Paul D. Carrington,
The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI.LEGAL F. 33, 45 (noting
that a "risk of aberrant, emotional decisionmaking in tort actions may be to deter investment in
activities that are exposed to tort liability. Economic activity of all kinds is a function of social
and political stability that facilitates planning; nineteenth-century American law was much
concerned with encouraging economic activity").
282. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983) (describing
Langdell's attempts to shape the study of law into a scientific inquiry). See generally JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976)
(outlining legal academia's movement through the late nineteenth century toward the view of
law as science).
283. Dooley, supra note 260, at 354.
284. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 38-39 (1986).
285. See LEVINE, supra note 260, at 25 (explaining the movement against the jury in the late
nineteenth century and noting that "[tihe jury's freedom of action was also restricted, perhaps in
part as a result of the growing professionalism of the legal system and the disdain that many
prominent lawyers of the late-nineteenth century had for the nation's growing masses.").
286. Dooley, supra note 260, at 355-56.
287. See, e.g., Green, supra note 256, at 357 ("The taking over of the jury's functions in
negligence cases by appellate courts has been steadily progressing everywhere ...");William
Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1719 (1997)
(arguing that in "moving away from broad definitions of duty and toward particularized
definitions of duty," the Texas Supreme Court shifts "more of the normative work in tort
litigation away from juries and toward judges").
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experience to bear in fashioning informed and consistent rulings. 28 8 In
addition, jury determinations of foreseeability lend scarce guidance to
people in conducting their daily lives, Judges might seek to create
clear, specific, and ordered rules for behavior by ruling on
foreseeability in the context of duty. 28 9 One might argue that by
entrusting juries to decide the often outcome-determinative issue of
foreseeability, the court is essentially abdicating its power to decide
290
the scope of one's duty under the circumstances.
As compelling as such arguments may be, however, the
arguments in favor of leaving foreseeability decisions to the jury are
more so. Perhaps most persuasive are the reasons that breach and
(likely) proximate cause were assigned to the jury in the first place.
Decisions of foreseeability of risk, harm, or plaintiff are not
particularly "legal" in that they require special training, expertise, or
even instruction. Nor do they call for consideration of far-reaching
policy concerns.
Rather, foreseeability determinations require
common sense, common experience, and application of the standards
and behavioral norms of the community. Who better to render such
judgments than a cross-section of that very community? 29 1 The
average juror in this age of mass-communication is at least as
educated and sophisticated as were those whom the English and
colonial courts held in such high esteem.
It is true that a judge, through years of trial experience, may
bring cumulative knowledge of community norms to the table in
288. See Kelley, supra note 2, at 1041-42 (explaining that the jury is "a one-shot decisionmaker without prior experience in applying the [breach] standard").
289. THE COMMON LAW, supra note 21, at 88-103; see Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with
Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1192, 1194, 1202-06 (2001) (detailing norm creation in the
context of breach of negligence in torts); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 69, at 1830-32
(explaining that judicial determination of foreseeability has a prioritizing effect on the public's
various duties of care toward others).
290. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 139,
162-63 (1996) ("[T]he jury, when deciding the proximate or legal cause issue, is free to apply its
sense of justice to the particular case before it. By entrusting the jury with the power to set the
limits of the defendant's duty in the particular case as a matter of fact/law the court is
essentially abdicating its decisionmaking power in the particular case.").
291. See THE COMMON LAW, supra note 21, at 119-20 (arguing that leaving breach to the jury
is a way of accessing the common experience of mankind in assessing danger under particular
circumstances); Kelley, supra note 52, at 87 ('"The ordinary reasonable man standard of care
applied by the jury can be seen as a way of asking a cross-section of the community wheth,r the
defendant breached the relevant social rule or practice."). But see Carrington, supra note 281, at
42:
[A]ny contemporary assessment of the jury ought to take account of the reality that
'community' in America is a pale imitation of the social condition that gave rise to the
institution of the jury. America is today far more an aggregation of individuals than a
community, and the conception of a verdict as an expression of community morality is
simply in most places quaint.
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deciding any particular foreseeability question.
Long experience,
however, also breeds opinion, perspective, and the hasty
compartmentalization of new cases into long-constructed categories.
Experience may therefore engender pre-judgment and, potentially,
narrow judgment. 292 In fact, because many state judges are elected,
their experience may bring more than intellectual and professional
biases; judges may hold vested political interests in reducing (or
increasing) certain classes of liability. The genius of the jury is that it
brings to each case multiple perspectives, both shared and diverse
experiences, and (with the exception of the occasional attorney-juror) a
legal tabula rasa.293 To put it simply-especially when considering a
question like foreseeability that is part-analysis, part-community
experience, and part-gestalt-perhaps twelve heads are better than
one. The Supreme Court once echoed this sentiment in defense of the
jury's dominion:
It is this class of cases [negligence] ...that the law commits to the decision of a jury.
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and men of
little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in what they
have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer;
these sit together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the
facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is
the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the
common affairs of life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer
294
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.

Furthermore, were judges to continue to decide foreseeability
in the context of duty, courts' understandings of community standards
may run the risk of ossification.
Particularized duty standards,
consisting of individual judges' divination of the customs of the age,
are frozen as precedent-immune to the natural evolution of the
community.
Jury decisions, by contrast, are not thus limiting.
Indeed, the generality of the reasonable person standard and of the

292. KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 237; Fleming James, Jr., Functionsof Judge and Jury
in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 668, 685-87 (1949)); Steinbock et al., supra note 278, at 275
(citing Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 116 (1924):
The question of what a reasonable person would have done under the circumstances is
generally for the jury, because of 'the public's desire to have its conduct judged by the
layman ('the man on the street') rather than by the more sophisticated and expert
judgment of the trained lawyer, whose judicial experience may have given him a
biased point of view.
293. Although it is true that because of their diversity, different juries might arrive at
inconsistent results given any one set of facts, at least each decision is made by those whose
customs likely guided (or should have guided) the defendant's behavior in the first place. In
addition, the jury's independence from the legal tradition might, as one scholar suggests,
"humanize the law" and operate as a "backlash against one-sided and harsh, judicially-created
tort doctrines" such as contributory negligence. Landsman, supra note 281, at 605.
294. Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 657, 663-64 (1873).
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various standards for proximate cause exists precisely to allow tort
liability to evolve with changing cultural mores. 295 It is important
that foreseeability determinations enjoy the same flexibility.
This point leads to an even more fundamental reason to leave
foreseeability (and therefore breach and proximate cause) to the
jury-foreseeability determinations are particularly fact-dependent
and case-specific. As Professor Dobbs explains, "[r]ules declaring that
no duty exists ... are expressions of 'global' policy ... rules of law
having the quality of generality." 296 Of course, breach and proximate
cause also entail policy-like judgments. The only palpable distinction
is that duty determinations-because decided by the judge-are
categorical, whereas breach and proximate cause constitute casespecific judgments. The importance of this distinction is perhaps best
highlighted (at least in the context of breach) by the now-archetypal
297
railroad-crossing cases, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman
and Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co. 298 The plaintiffs in each of these
cases were struck by oncoming trains while driving their respective
vehicles across railroad grade crossings despite obstructed views of the
tracks. 299 Justice Holmes, writing for the court in Goodman, held
categorically that "if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train
is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle .. ."300 In
so holding, Justice Holmes acted upon his longstanding view that
judges should more actively prescribe specific duties in categories 30of1
cases in which judges might readily apply their cumulative wisdom.
The weakness of this approach was soon made apparent by the facts of
Pokora, in which the layout of a different grade crossing was such that
to exit one's car to check for oncoming trains-as was one's duty
pursuant to Goodman-would be to increase, rather than to reduce,
the risk of catastrophe. 30 2 Thus, Justice Cardozo (who had, by that
295. See Steinbock et al., supra note 278, at 275 ("Proximate cause is defined in relatively
general terms precisely because we want the jury to apply its own experience and values to any
further norm elaboration, a process that is purposely kept invisible and case specific."). But see
generally Abraham, supra note 289 (arguing that the open-endedness of the reasonable person
standard is the source of the "trouble with negligence").
296. DOBBS, supranote 11, § 227, at 579.
297. 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
298. 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934).
299. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 69; Pokora, 292 U.S. at 100.
300. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70.
301. See id. ("It is true ... that the question of due care very generally is left to the jury. But
we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down
once for all by the Courts."); Kenneth Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 VA. L. REV.
1481, 1485 n.ll (1992) (noting that Justice Holmes's Goodman opinion was an attempt to
implement the theories he had propounded in THE COMMON LAW).
302. Pokora, 292 U.S. at 582-83.
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time, replaced Justice Holmes on the court) was forced to some fancy
footwork in characterizing Justice Holmes's broad duty holding as
dictum and in reassigning the negligence issue in grade-crossing cases
30 3
to the jury, where it belonged.
The lesson of the Goodman and Pokora cases is that categorical
rules of conduct-that is, those not tied to a narrow set of facts-will
often result in injustice when applied to some later, unimagined set of
facts. This lesson applies similarly to no-duty rules 304 and to rules
regarding proximate cause, 30 5 and it is doubly true with regard to
decisions of foreseeability. The foreseeability component of breach and
proximate cause determinations is particularly fact-dependent and
case-specific. It is, as one court explains "a judgment about a course of
events, a factual judgment that one often makes outside any legal
context." 30 6 For illustration, recall the facts of Bryant v. Glastetter,in
which the plaintiff tow-truck driver was hit by a car while removing
the defendant's vehicle (impounded due to the defendant's DUI) from
the side of a highway.30 7 In determining the existence of a duty on the
part of the defendant, the court considered whether the plaintiff and
the type or manner of the plaintiffs injury were foreseeable. One can
imagine many slight variations in the facts of Bryant that might
influence one's analysis of foreseeability-whether the road on which
the plaintiff was driving was typically busy or infrequently-traveled;
whether the defendant had been driving drunk at night or during the
day; whether the police moved the car before the tow truck arrived; or
whether other pedestrians had previously been hit on that road.
Unfortunately, the limits of the human imagination fall far short of
prescience.
Not even the most experienced judge is capable of
anticipating all possible facts that might affect future foreseeability
303. Id. at 582.
304. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 11, § 227, at 579 ("[N]o-duty rules should be invoked only
when all cases they cover fall substantially within the policy that frees the defendant of
liability."); GREEN, supra note 12, at 57-58 (suggesting that broad limits on duties cannot be
determined ex ante due to the infinite variety of potential facts); Leon Green, The Duty Problem
in Negligence Cases, (part 1), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1022-23 (1928) (stating that the "passing
of judgment in bulk.., is a dangerous thing" due to the limited prescience of human thought).
305. See, e.g., Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., Inc., 136 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn. 1940)
("[The Palsgraf case], by virtue of the sharp difference of opinion of the judges, should be a
warning to appellate courts not lightly to assume the primary duty of determining liability or
non-liability, in actions of tort, but to leave that duty where the Constitution has placed it, with
the jury, as triers of facts, and if they act capriciously and arbitrarily to supervise their action.");
Galligan, supra note 3, at 1528 (stating that in the context of proximate cause, "where the
primary issue before the court relates, essentially, to what is fair given the facts before the court,
then perhaps the jury is the best decision-maker.").
306. Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1327-28 (Or. 1987) (holding that
foreseeability is a question for the jury).
307. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
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determinations in analogous cases. By ruling on foreseeability in the
context of duty, however, this is exactly what a court attempts to do.
Of course, one might argue that the problem highlighted by
Goodman and Pokora lies not with judges deciding foreseeability
under the rubric of duty, but with judges failing to limit such holdings
expressly to the narrow facts of the particular case. Indeed, even
under the proposed Restatement, courts may still decide foreseeability
30 8
in the context of breach or proximate cause as a matter of law.
What is the difference between a determination of foreseeability as a
matter of law and a narrowly-tailored foreseeability-based duty
ruling? This is an important challenge, and three responses seem apt.
The first response has, in essence, already been discussedeven a narrowly-tailored foreseeability ruling is ill-advised if rendered
by the entity less capable of doing so. For the reasons stated above
juries, at least in the first instance, should be left to decide close
questions of foreseeability.
Second, although judges might theoretically limit their duty
decisions to the exact facts before them, such decisions simply run
counter to the established function of duty. Duty decisions, by long
judicial custom, are read broadly. They create rules, they carry the
weight of precedent, and they are meant to govern categories of future
cases. Although battles often rage in later cases over the breadth of a
prior court's duty holding, 30 9 the common judicial understanding is
that the rule might well apply beyond the facts of the case that
established it. Judgments as a matter of law, however, begin with the
opposite presumption. They are presumed to be limited narrowly to
the facts. As questions of foreseeability are closely fact-dependent,
judgment as a matter of law is the more appropriate mechanism.
Third, by forcing judges to decide foreseeability as a matter of
law (if at all), the proposed Restatement effects a subtle but important
shift in judicial perspective. Because duty is a question for the court,
a judge is free to decide the questions underlying duty however the
judge sees fit-hopefully with reason and good judgment, and with
only appellate courts to check the judge's work. By contrast, judgment
as a matter of law requires the court to apply the "no reasonable jury
standard." It asks the judge to abandon personal reasoning and to

308. See TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1, supra note 20, § 8(b) ("When, in light of all the facts
relating to the actor's conduct, reasonable minds can differ as to whether the conduct lacks
reasonable care, it is the function of the jury to make that determination.").
309. A perfect example being whether the duty, imposed on psychologists in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California,551 P.2d 334, 348 (Cal. 1976), to warn others of dangers
posed by patients extends to social workers, school counselors, and health care workers of all
stripes.
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reach back in memory to analogous decisions by past juries, to
imagine the potential reasoning of family and friends, of neighbors,
barbers, and bank tellers, of the folks on the other side of the tracks,
and of those with the wrong candidate's bumper-sticker-and it asks
the judge to imagine what those people might decide were they
impaneled on the jury. The judge must gore her own ox, if necessary.
For the same reasons that foreseeability decisions are best left to the
jury in the first -instance, the mental exercise initiated by the
reasonable jury standard is equally important.
The debate will, no doubt, never end regarding the proper
balance of power between judge and jury in negligence cases. The
foregoing arguments, however, strongly support the proposed
Restatement's implicit shift from judge to jury of the primary role in
deciding foreseeability. Although such a shift is not without support
in the case law, 310 for most jurisdictions the Restatement Third's
proposal will represent a significant doctrinal change. Nevertheless,
as Part IV.C below suggests, although the shift will affect the means
by which courts analyze questions of duty and foreseeability, it will
change the substantive outcomes of negligence cases only at the
margins.

C. The FinalAnalysis: Little Significant Change in the Outcome of
Negligence Cases

Many in the ALI and the legal academy opposed the initial
drafts of the proposed Restatement Third. 311 For some of the same
reasons, many will oppose the current draft-particularly once the
transformative force of Section 7 becomes apparent. In Section 7, the
ALI endorses a notion of the judge's role in negligence law that
contradicts much of the case law of the past century and a half. It
reminds courts that their place in duty decisions is as bluntinstrument gatekeepers, and it reinforces the jury's primacy as
factfinder and as enforcer of fact-specific community standards. In an
age of tort-reform, skyrocketing insurance premiums, and razzle310. See, e.g., Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condos. Homeowners Ass'n, 941 P.2d 218, 223 (Ariz.
1997) (noting that "danger [that is, foreseeable risk] neither creates nor eradicates duty; it only
indicates what conduct may be reasonable to fulfill the duty" and stating that "we disapprove of
attempts to equate the concepts of duty with specific details of conduct"); Donaca v. Curry
County, 734 P.2d 1339, 1344 (Or. 1987) (holding that facts of each specific case bear on
foreseeable risk, therefore making improper a rule of law that attempts to cover all possible fact
scenarios).
311. See supranotes 150-151 and accompanying text.
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dazzle plaintiffs' attorneys, these are not wholly welcome reminders.
In the final analysis, however, how much power is really lost to judges
under the proposed Restatement? How much effect will Section 7
have on the ultimate outcome of negligence, cases?' The answer to both
questions, most likely, is not much.
Section 7(a) imposes a duty on any defendant that was a cause
in fact of the plaintiffs injury-a broad sweep, to be sure. Pursuant to
Section 7(b), however, courts retain the power to seize upon factors
that a jury might miss (and indeed upon which a jury is not really
empowered to act) and to carve out broad policy-based exceptions to
the general duty of care.
Thus, where a power company's
unreasonable actions cause a city-wide blackout and scores of related
injuries, a court may still, pursuant to Section 7(b), deny or limit the
company's duty due to the public's need for the company's continuing
solvency.3 12 In so-called "wrongful life" claims against physicians for
the failure to sterilize a plaintiff as requested, courts might still
decline to impose a duty due to limitations in the ability of the trial
process adequately to value the plaintiffs loss. 313 In social host
liability cases, courts may yet deny the existence of a duty to protect
the American tradition of beer and Monday Night Football. 314 The
only catch, as was explained in Part III.E above, is that under Section
7(b) courts must muster the gumption to make such exceptions
explicit, without burying their reasoning in discussions of duty and
foreseeability.
Furthermore, although Section 7 forces considerations of
foreseeability out of the realm of duty and out of the reach of
unfettered judicial discretion, courts may still decide foreseeabilityin the context of breach or proximate cause-as a matter of law. As
previously discussed, courts must render such decisions pursuant to
the "no reasonable jury standard." It is thus no doubt true that under
the proposed Restatement some greater measure of foreseeability
issues will reach a jury. To the extent that this occurs, it is properly
so. If a court is faced with a case that (1) involves no policy concern
strong enough to justify a categorical denial of duty under Section
7(b), and (2) requires a judgment of foreseeability of risk, type or
manner of injury, or plaintiff so ambiguous that reasonable members
312. See Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that the
defendant utility owed no duty of care to individual tenant and that liability was limited to those
in direct contractual privity).
313. See Galligan, supra note 3, at 1511 (noting that in the context of claims for wrongful
life, "a court may decide there is no duty owed [for] .... administrative convenience," and
"because of problems with valuing life").
314. See supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
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of the community might differ in their resolution of the matter, then
such a case is almost tautologically the stuff of jury deliberation.
Still, courts are perennially reluctant to admit to deciding
policy and some dre extraordinarily hesitant to invade the jury's realm
by deciding breach or proximate cause as a matter of law. One might
argue that courts' intransigence in this regard may, despite the
pressure brought to bear by Section 7, lead to greater numbers of
cases reaching the jury.3 15 This is indeed a possibility. On the other
hand, one suspects that courts' desire to reach the "right" result, in the
most expedient manner, will often prevail. Besides, the collective
brainpower and prestige of the AL gives them cover. It thus seems
likely that any upturn in jury decisions upon courts' adoption of the
proposed Restatement will appear only at the margins. Most cases
currently dismissed for lack of foreseeability in the context of duty will
still be dismissed as a matter of law or pursuant to Section 7(b). A
brief analysis of one set of difficult and controversial casesnegligence suits against handgun manufacturers-will test this
prediction.
In recent years, victims of handgun-related violence have
brought a variety of negligence suits against the manufacturers of
handguns.
In some such actions, the plaintiffs claim that the
manufacturer negligently designed its guns to make them more
attractive to criminals.
In other suits, plaintiffs argue that the
manufacturer marketed its product to inappropriate users. Still
others contend that the manufacturer negligently distributed its guns
so that dangerous customers might more easily purchase them. 31 6 To
date, such suits have not gained much traction in the courts, their
primary impediment being courts' determination that the
manufacturer owed no duty of care. 317 For some courts, the suits
amount to claims of nonfeasance-that is, claims that the
manufacturer failed affirmatively to protect the plaintiffs against the
crimes of third parties. Such courts dismiss the plaintiffs' claims on
grounds that the manufacturer owed no duty in the absence of a
special relationship. 318 Other courts decline to impose a duty not on
the basis of nonfeasance, but (at least in part) upon characterizing the
plaintiffs harm as unforeseeable. 319
315. Or perhaps, for this reason, some courts will decline to adopt the Restatement Third's
approach in the first place.
316. Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-defective Products: An Analysis
and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 909 (2002).
317. Id. at 911.
318. Id. at 911, 953 (citing McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997)).
319. Id. at 952-53 (citing Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (Ct. App. 1999)).
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Were courts to apply Section 7(a) of the proposed Restatement,
dismissal for lack of duty might not come so readily. Pursuant to
Section 7(a), if the gun manufacturer's conduct was a factual cause of
the victim's harm, the manufacturer owed a duty of reasonable care.
Although showing factual causation might prove difficult for plaintiffs
in some cases, the effort may produce more palatable fruit than the
unexplained and rather arbitrary characterizations of nonfeasance
and unforeseeability currently on the menu. 32 0 Even were gun suits to
clear Section 7(a), however, courts might nonetheless dismiss the
plaintiffs' claims for lack of duty. Many courts seem hesitant to
impose tort liability on gun manufacturers for policy reasons, as guns
are legal and perhaps even protected by the Constitution.
Furthermore, guns are obviously dangerous instruments and, in most
negligence cases against manufacturers, the guns worked as intended.
Thus, for many courts the duty question likely boils down to a
3 21
proposed referendum on the continuing market for handguns.
Section 7(b) of the proposed Restatement provides courts ready means
for declining to impose a duty on grounds that such a volatile social
issue is best left to the elected branches of government.
Even were courts to impose a duty on manufacturers pursuant
to Section 7, however, they would likely still dismiss handgun claims
as a matter of law for lack of breach or proximate cause. In the
absence of evidence that a particular gun manufacturer intentionally
set out to attract criminal customers (one would hope a rare finding),
many claims of negligent product design, marketing, or distribution
are supported by reasonable sales-related goals and thus potentially
amenable to summary judgment on the issue of breach. Furthermore,
even when it was foreseeable to a gun manufacturer that a particular
design or sales practice might lead to guns falling into the hands of
dangerous individuals, the costs of avoiding such a result might well
lead a court to rule against breach as a matter of law. 32 2 In addition,
many gun-related cases are subject to dismissal as a matter of law for
lack of proximate cause, either because "the route that a gun takes
from manufacturer to the city streets [is] 'long and tortuous,' "323 or
320. See id. at 953 (explaining that most gun cases dismissed for lack of a special
relationship rest on "the assumption, mostly unspoken, . . . that the defendant's conduct can best
be characterized as nonfeasance").
321. See id. at 955-59 (describing the concern that the plaintiffs in gun manufacturing claims
in effect seek to rid the market of an undesirable product).
322. For an excellent discussion of the various considerations in the context of breach in
cases against gun manufacturers, see id. at 940-946.
323. Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance? 68 (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (citing City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A.,
Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 423-24 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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because most such cases involve superseding gross negligence or
324
intentional misconduct on the part of the gun owner or victim.
If the handgun foil is any indication, it seems unlikely that
courts' adoption of the proposed Restatement will be sweepingly
outcome-determinative.
Rather, the effect of Section 7 on the
outcomes of cases will likely be marginal, and thus outweighed by the
many benefits afforded by the simpler and more transparent duty
structure that Section 7 provides. As any prediction, of course, this
one will have to be tested by practice and time.

V. CONCLUSION

It seems clear from the discussion at recent ALI meetings that
the potential impact of Section 7 of the proposed Restatement has not
yet dawned on many ALI members. Once it does, many may raise
objections similar to those aimed at the initial drafts of the projectthat the ALI should not seek to change the law or impact the outcomes
of cases. In one sense, such objections would be valid. If adopted by
courts, Section 7 will reshape the concept of duty in negligence in
subtle, but significant fashion. It will strip courts of their beloved tool,
foreseeability. And it will force courts to assume what some find to be
the prickly clothes of the policymaker and the jury-empath. The ALI
should not shy away from the path laid out by Section 7, howeverand neither, ultimately, should the courts. Section 7 renders the
general test for negligence duty comprehensible, consistent, and
conceptually honest, for the first time in over a century. Perhaps more
importantly, the proposed Restatement realigns tort doctrine with the
inherited and imminently sensible assignment of functions to the
judge and jury-the function of the judge as broad-brush policymaker
(whose transparent decisions are kept under close watch by the
elected branches), and the jury as factfinder and as the collective
instrument of community norms.
Should Section 7 prove to be
outcome-determinative in some cases, so be it. The improvements in
the decisionmaking process are well worth a little transitory

324. Id. at 69 (citing People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 201
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003)). Of course, were the courts to adopt the proposed Restatement Third's
"scope of the risk" test for proximate cause, it seems likely that the plaintiff would prevail-the
harm suffered is precisely what makes the gun manufacturer negligent.
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instability. Should some judges feel reluctant to adopt an approach
that at least on its face limits their control over negligence cases, they
will come around-even the most consumptive among us tires
eventually of strawberry shortcake!,
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The period from May 2003 through June 2004 was one of the
most active periods for the law of self-incrimination since Miranda
was decided in 1966. This Article focuses on three cases from that
period - Missouri v. Seibert and United States v. Patane from 2004,
and Chavez v. Martinez, decided in 2003. These cases, along with
the blockbuster from 2000, Dickerson v. United States, demonstrate
what has been happening to the Court's self-incrimination
jurisprudence. It is the Article's thesis that although the Court is
purporting to rest these decisions on the Self-Incrimination Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, what the Court is really doing when it
decides whether to extend or limit Miranda is employing traditional
due process analysis. The Article assesses Miranda's health as a
result of these decisions and concludes that it is the traditionaldue
process principles that have become central to keeping Miranda
contained that also keep the decision alive.

